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IDEAS 
Lister Sinclair 
Good evening. This is Ideas about development. 
Harry Truman 
The peoples of the earth face the future with grave 
uncertainty. In this time of doubt they look to the 
United States as never before for good will, strength, 
and wise leadership. It is fitting, therefore, that we ... 
Lister Sinclair 
American president-elect Harry Truman makes his 
inaugural address. The U.S. has emerged from the ww 
as the world's pre-eminent power and Truman 
confidently assumes the mantle of world leadership by 
projecting a new mission for the United States, what will 
become known as international development. 
Harry Truman 
We must embark on a bold, new program for making 
the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial 
progress available for the improvement and growth of 
underdeveloped areas. More than half of the people of 
the world are living in conditions approaching misery. 
Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. 
Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their 
poverty is a handicap and a threat, both to them and to 
more prosperous areas. For the first time in history, 
humanity possesses the knowledge and skill to relieve 
the suffering of these people. The United States is pre- 
eminent among the nations in the development of 
industrial and scientific techniques. I believe that we 
should make available to peace-loving people the benefits 
of our store of technical knowledge, in order to help 
them realize their aspirations for a better life. And in 
co-operation with other nations, we should foster capital 
investment in areas needing development. Such new 
economic development must be devised and controlled to 
the benefit of the peoples of the areas in which they are 
established. The old imperialism, exploitation for 
foreign profit, has no place in our plans. 
Lister Sinclair 
In 1949 international development had a bright, innocent 
sound, at least for Truman's American listeners. The 
President could still plausibly portray the United States 
as the very image of a developed society, a model all the 
world could imitate. Today, as development staggers 
nto its fifth decade, the very meaning of the concept has 
become uncertain. The U.N.'s Brundtland Commission 
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now calls for sustainable development, but many doubt 
that this is more than a contradiction in terms and call 
for more fundamental rethinking. Tonight on Ideas we'll 
examine the question of whether development has a 
future. You'll hear from German thinker Wolfgang 
Sachs, who thinks it doesn't. 
Wolfgang Sachs 
Those societies after which development was supposed 
to be patterned, namely North America and Europe, are 
marching into a dead end. So what kind of example is 
that? The moment you stop considering North Amwka 
and Europe as an example, it doesn't make sense any 
more to talk about development. 
Lister Sinclair 
And you'll hear from David Brooks of Canada's 
International Development Research Centre, who thinks 
that development can and must be redefined. 
David Brooks 
We're like an airplane flying in some mountains and 
when our navigator spots a mountain directly ahead of 
us, there are a number of things we can do, but one of 
them is not to turn off the engines of the airplane. You 
don't stop the airplane in mid-air. And modern 
economies are much more like that. You just can't stop 
them. You can't just walk away from development at 
this point in time. 
Lister Sinclair 
Tonight's program is the first of four programs called 
"Redefining Development." The series is written and 
presented by David Cayley. 
David Cayley 
In 1966, American sociologist Irving Louis Horowitz 
published a book called Three Worlds of Development. 
Its title embodied an idea whose time had come. Soon 
virtually the whole of Asia, Africa and Latin America 
could be swept into one, neat, conceptual dustpan called 
"The Third World." This way of speaking has now 
become problematic. With the collapse of Communism 
and the end of the cold war, it no longer makes sense to 
speak of a third world. Nor do the rich countries of the 
first world any longer appear as objects of unambiguous 
admiration. The obvious damage development has done 
to the natural fabric of our own societies has made us 
only too aware that our own way of life is unsustainable. 
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This has created a crisis for those who want to renew 
and reinvigorate the project of international 
development, so they have invented "sustainable 
development" to provide the new conceptual framework 
they require. But there are others who claim that 
development itself is an obsolete idea. It's too 
compromised, too weighted down with contradictory 
meanings, they say, to be of any further use. One of 
these thinkers is Wolfgang Sachs, a research fellow at 
the Institute of Advanced Studies at Essen in West 
Germany. Sachs's background is in the German Green 
movement. He worked on alternative energy policies for 
Germany as part of the research group on energy and 
society at the Technical University of Berlin, and wrote 
a book on the life of the automobile, now being 
translated into English. Then in the early eighties he 
edited a journal called Development, published in Rome. 
And that's the point at which my conversation with 
Wolfgang Sachs begins. 
Wolfgang Sachs 
I served as the editor of that journal for three and a half, 
four years, not because I felt myself to be a third-world 
expert, somebody who knows how development down 
there in the south should go on and should be executed. 
No, it was rather because I wanted to represent our 
historical experiences with progress, with modernization, 
this extraordinary experience in our own countries, to 
represent them and to tell them to third-world 
representatives, and I wanted to pull these experiences 
into the general discourse on development--what 
development is all about. I think today you cannot 
discuss development anymore without taking into 
consideration that those nations who had long been 
thought to be the ideals of development, that those 
nations today have ended up to be in a dead end. The 
moment we talk about development, we necessarily 
include the image, the idea of a fully developed society 
and historically this has been the United States basically, 
and Europe. Now the moment we do not know anymore 
what a fully developed society would be, there is no 
point anymore in talking about underdevelopment. So 
the whole conceptual framework seems to be crumbling 
today. So I thought it is time to admit that we have here 
in front of us what I would call a mental ruin--it's not 
only that buildings can turn into ruins--and that it's time 
to look at this mental ruin to examine the layers upon 
which it is built, to be amazed at the kind of structures, 
the kind of buildings, the kind of annexes, what the 
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shape of this ruin is, in order then, in a way, to leave it 
behind, to say, well, this has happened in the past, and 
this we can say in order to explain to ourselves what has 
happened, but now it's time to leave the shadow of these 
ruins. So in order to be better able to say farewell to 
development, I thought it would be nice to have an 
archeology of it. 
David Cayley 
From when do you date the concept of development? 
Wolfgang Sachs 
I would like to modify slightly the question. I would 
rather say where I see the concept of underdevelopment 
was born. And that is surprisingly clear. It's just 
enough to look into the Oxford English Dictionary and 
you will see that it was President Truman, in his 
inauguration speech as president on the 20th of January 
of '49, who used first the term "underdeveloped areas" 
in this world. Before '49 this was not known. One did 
not speak in that term about countries, let's say, in the 
southern hemisphere. 
David Cayley 
But surely the colonial powers had always regarded these 
same areas now being called underdeveloped from a 
fairly lofty height. Did they not always regard these 
areas as underdeveloped? 
Wolfgang Sachs 
No, I don't think so. Of course, the colonial powers 
looked down upon these countries. However, it was a 
looking-down-upon which somehow comes out of a 
different attitude. It comes out of a different mental 
framework. Colonialism basically was patterned after 
the father-child relationship. These countries down there 
were not mature yet. They were immature. They were 
ignorant. They were somehow still in the childhood of 
human evolution and so had to be put under authority. 
They had to be put under moral supervision. Lord 
Lugard in the twenties, concerning the British empire, 
has described the mission of England in a double way. 
He said, first the mission of England, of course, is to 
profit from the overseas territories, and second, 
however, more importantly, he said, it is necessary 
England has to be there in order to lead the natives on to 
a higher moral plane. Now it is after the second world 
war that these two different goals converge into one, 
coincide into one, and this is then called development, 
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because now economic mobilization equals higher 
civilization. So now these two formerly distinct goals 
collapse into one and this collapsing into one has been 
possible because now we don't talk about a relationship 
of authority anymore between England or France and the 
overseas territories, but we talk about relationships of 
commerce, of trade, of markets. So on the one hand the 
mission of development, of course, was a mission which 
was gladly assumed and defined by the United States, 
which became the dominating world power after the 
second world war. In order to project its global 
mission, it needed development, in particular, because 
development was, as I said before, not linked to the 
colonial discourse. On the other hand, however, it is 
also clear that there was not only after the war a world 
power seeking its mission, there were also many new 
states emerging, new governments being formed who 
were seeking a raison d'etat as well. The anti-colonial 
movements in the fifties, in the sixties, and in particular 
the young nations, searched desperately for a 
justification of why they are there, which was not an 
easy thing to do because in many of these countries 
states were not known, at least modern states in our 
sense were not known. So in order to impose taxes, in 
order to set up administrations, in order to extend 
control, in order to mobilize step by step a whole 
country, some mobilizing goal had to be set up. And 
this was development. 
David Cayley 
How do these nations consent to feel about themselves, 
in your view, when they agree to be portrayed as 
underdeveloped or developing? 
Wolfgang Sachs 
Well, looked at from today, it seems to me that more 
and more people realize that in the fifties and the sixties 
most of these young nations set out to run on a racetrack 
which leads towards a dead end, towards an impasse, 
and that whereas let's say in the fifties and sixties it 
would have been imaginable to start off in various 
directions according to the heritage of each country, 
today many countries have embarked upon the same path 
and they are running into the same direction and find it 
increasingly difficult to find their own way, to branch 
off from the direction which has been indicated by the 
United States and to find their own way--in a way to 
tivent, to create their own project as a society, to work 
for a way to live together, to produce, to be in life 
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which conforms better to their traditions, to their long- 
standing aspirations, to what they really are inside. 
David Cayley 
You spoke a little while ago of Truman and of the 
origins of this discourse and the invention of the 
underdeveloped areas. You've then traced the idea of 
development through a number of permutations. Can 
you say, roughly, what these phases you see the idea of 
going through are until you come to the present, to 
sustainable development? 
Wolfgang Sachs 
In the fifties, development was basically the result of 
capital investment. So you would transfer capital, you 
would transfer later on certain qualifications, certain 
technical assistance. This input was supposed to get 
development going, to reach that point of take-off 
beyond which, as it was said, development or growth 
would be self-sustained. There were then modifications 
in the sixties. As I said already, one discovered that it's 
not only a problem of capital investment, it also has to 
do with people. So then one talked about manpower 
planning, schooling and education, in order to form 
manpower for development, to staff, if you want, the 
apparatus of producing GNP. I would say that then an 
important watershed has to be identified in the early 
seventies when it became increasingly clear that 
transferring capital-forming manpower was not enough, 
that, on the contrary, many development efforts had 
produced quite unexpected results; that, shortly 
speaking, with development, poverty grew, that people 
in the third world didn't become richer or didn't 
somehow embark on a general upward street, but that 
societies in the south polarized themselves. Some people 
became much richer and many others became much 
poorer. That was most forcefully, at least from a 
prominent political stage, expressed by McNamara in his 
famous speech in September '73, before the World Bank 
Assembly in Nairobi, where he drew that conclusion 
saying, we have to acknowledge that poverty has even 
increased and that development leads to the rich getting 
richer and the poor getting poorer. Now this 
acknowledgement, this admission, if you want, however, 
did not lead to what you would expect, that one would 
have abolished or abandoned the politics of development 
because they had failed. No, it led to another operation. 
It led to the extension of the concept of development and 
immediately McNamara already introduced a new 
3 
Redefining Development 
concept. He talked about rural development, about 
equitable development. So one dealt with the failure of 
development by extending the meaning of development. 
It was as if you have a building and now you see the 
building doesn't really fit and you put an annex to it, but 
the old building still stays there. You just put an annex 
to it--a second entrance, if you want. 
David Cayley 
This building of annex after annex is Sach's paradigm 
for the history of development. Development theory, in 
his view, has become something like the Ptolemaic 
astronomy of the Middle Ages. One deals with the fact 
that the theory doesn't really describe the motions of the 
planets all that accurately by constantly adding new 
epicycles to their orbits. Eventually the theory becomes 
meaningless. 
Wolfgang Sachs 
Whenever one noticed failure, destructive effects of 
development, the concept was extended. It exploded. 
And it ended up that development included both the 
injury as well as the therapy. So it was development to 
bring big dams - to India in order to . increase the 
production of electricity, as it was development to heal 
the wounds by working with the tribals there, who had 
been driven out of their land through this big dam. So 
the injury was called development and the therapy was 
called development, inflicting of wounds on an 
indigenous population, as well as healing these wounds. 
So development becomes a word which doesn't say 
anything anymore. It means one thing and it means also 
the contrary. This pattern I would now say has been 
maintained until the eighties and now in the middle of 
the eighties the rise of sustainable development as the 
new catchword certainly signals a new age of 
development. Again, in the eighties it was increasingly 
recognized that conventional development leads to 
environmental disruption. Now again, the consequence 
out of that recognition was not to finish with the 
business of development, but to extend development, to 
keep on a politics of growth and the conventional politics 
of development on the one hand, and on the other hand 
now also to take care of the environment, to invent new 
methods, to deal with problems of resource management, 
problems of environmental dislocation, problems of 
pollution. So for that reason now you have the 
Brundtland report, which can call itself a report on 
environment, but at the same time call for a five to 
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tenfold increase in the world GNP over the next twenty, 
thirty years. So again the same logic is at work. And 
in this case it is also nicely caught in the word itself. It 
is an oxymoron to talk about sustainable development, 
because, if you want development, then if it has in any 
way the same or a similar meaning to what it used to be, 
it means non-sustainable. And if you want 
sustainability, it's very questionable that you can have 
development. 
David Cayley 
By the time we get to sustainable development, we're a 
long way down a chain of consequences, where each 
new phase of development in a way is cleaning up the 
last phase or absorbing some new contradiction into this 
growing amoeba, as you have called concepts like 
development. Even if one accepts that's true, however, 
by the time you get that far down the chain, is there an 
alternative? 
Wolfgang Sachs 
Well, I think that the Brundtland report wants to have 
their cake and eat it. On the one hand, they would like 
more or less to continue the politics of development and 
growth, which have been around since the time of 
Truman, they would like to continue the enterprise to 
boost the GNP and to close a little bit the gap between 
north and south by bringing the south closer to the north 
and on the other hand they would like to do that in an 
ecologically peaceful way. And I think both are not 
possible. So if you want the perspective beyond the 
Brundtland report would be somewhat, what I said 
before about development, to admit that the ideology of 
development today is obsolete, that it doesn't make sense 
to talk about catching up, that the south catches up with 
the north, that it doesn't make sense to look for the 
future of southern countries by looking to the 
achievements of northern countries and that only a 
politics of wide diversity, a politics of manifold 
experimentation, an attempt to spell out the path out of 
the history and tradition of each country can perhaps--I 
don't say automatically--but can perhaps open up ways 
which make it possible to live in a decent manner on this 
planet, and to live in a decent manner without falling 
into the hands of a global, ecological management. 
David Cayley 
The alternative to development is usually portrayed as 
being stagnation, that is, one either develops or one 
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derdevelops. You're saying that the opposite term is 
a culturally directed... one can't say development then, 
but a culturally directed social project. 
Wolfgang Sachs 
Well, first of all, there is not one development. There 
can only be many, many, many developments, but then 
it doesn't make sense to talk about development 
anymore. There are different, if you wanf, projects, 
ideas, directions to follow, different guiding images and 
ideas. And they have already been there. If You think, 
early *&N-b led the *a, 
revolution under the slogan and under the image of 
ejidos, the hope was to create ejidos, which means a 
certain form of collective agriculture, a certain way of 
independent, collective communities, which are based on 
the Indian tradition. So it was an idea of what the good 
life is about, which came out of the Mexican history. 
The same was true for Gandhi. Gandhi's key word was 
swaraj, which meant a mixture of inner independence 
and outer independence. It was an idea which, again, 
had to do with the thousands and thousands of villages 
in India, which, for Gandhi, were looking for a way to 
e more villages and to -conform more to their own 
ideas. Now I would say the contrary to development 
is... let's say global experimenting, I think i5 for me the 
contrary to development, an experimenting which is 
more and more indispensable, again, because we are in 
a situation where the one royal path towArds higher 
development doesn't exist anymore. Now each country 
in the world is faced with the question where to go and 
no country knows a compelling answer. So all countries 
are in search. So the only thing you can do is, if you 
want, to broaden the possibilities, to let flourish what is 
there, to increase the richness of forms of life we have 
in this world. 
David Cayley 
It seems evidently true that, as you were saying, the 
royal road appears to be crumbling. As aNvareness of 
some kind of environmental crisis intensifies, it seems 
the dead end becomes more evident, but this doesn't 
necessarily mean that the lure of the modern then 
disappears, does it?--that everyone suddenly wakes up 
from the dream? 
Wolfgang Sachs 
is clear that the most important effect of modern 
ec`nnology s a symbolic Wnal y m sayntg:l NAL 
Redefining Development 
whatever we here in the north have created has a 
tremendous impact on the imagination of the peoples of 
this world. So even if they have no means to live like 
that, their heads are full of images of that world and the 
images they used to have in their mind are fading away. 
So they are going to be stuck in that dilemma on the one 
hand, having their minds set on the style of life in the 
north, which is projected to them in the idealized 
fashions of television, and on the other hand, not having 
the possibilities, the resources, to do that. How to get 
out of that impasse is a deep historic question, which 
en1gf.+hiF ntzu:; hJit.alm 
the next century. 
David Cayley 
So when you say that development is over, that you're 
doing an archeology in a ruins, is this quite strictly true? 
Wolfgang Sachs 
Well, I do it in a polemical fashion. I don't make an 
empirical statement, but I would like to clear the 
possibility for debate or for a fight, if you want. 
David Cayley 
Wolfgang Sachs of the Institute for Advanced Studies, in 
Essen, West Germany. Wolfgang Sachs calls 
development an amoeba word, a plastic, verbal element 
which can be used to lend weight to statements which no 
longer have any precise meaning. As such, he considers 
that it's become a hindrance, rather than a spur, to 
creative thought. David Brooks disagrees. He thinks 
that sustainable development can be given a precise, 
operational meaning. Brooks is a long-time 
environmentalist and a founder of the Canadian branch 
of Friends of the Earth, Energy Probe and the federal 
government's Office of Energy Conservation in the early 
seventies. Today he's the associate director for 
environmental policy in the social sciences division of 
the federal government's International Development 
Research Centre. We spoke in Ottawa recently and he 
told me that he thinks that the U.N.'s Brundtland 
Commission provides the necessary framework for 
rethinking development. 
David Brooks 
The Brundtland report, for all of its deficiencies and 
fuzziness and wanting-to-eat-your-cake-and-have-it-too 




politicians and not by environmentalists, the fact that it 
was a consensus and not just an east-west consensus, 
which is turning out to be relatively easy, but a north- 
south consensus, made it important and, within the 
notions and the way it's been developed since then by 
both ecologists and economists and political scientists, 
we're getting to a framework, an operational framework 
that is something you can use to decide what you should 
do tomorrow and next year and the year after to make 
policy choices that's far, far ahead of what was available 
at the time of "Limits to Growth," which is a relatively 
important ... I mean again "Limits to Growth" was 
seminal--it gave us a term, it gave us a concept--but it 
was naive in its operational implications. In describing 
the policy conclusions of "The Limits to Growth," 
Dennis Meadows and others used to often use the 
metaphor of a ship sailing toward an iceberg and they 
would say that when the lookout sights ahead and 
identifies an iceberg, the captain doesn't simply say, 
"Look you're a worrymonger," and dismiss it. What the 
captain does is stop the ship. I don't think that analogy 
makes any sense at all. A much better analogy: we're 
like an airplane flying in some mountains and when our 
navigator spots a mountain directly ahead of us, there 
are a number of things we can do, but one of them is not 
to turn off the engines of the airplane. You don't stop 
the airplane in mid-air. And modern economies are 
much more like that. You just can't stop them. You 
can adjust them here and there, you can gradually build 
in new goals, you can move them to the right, left, up 
and down, but you certainly don't just turn them off. 
The Brundtland Report clearly recognized that. I don't 
think they carried it far enough. I think they weren't 
adjusting the direction of the airplane adequately enough. 
It did provide though the basis for saying we can make 
much more significant changes and in fact we will have 
to make more significant changes. 
David Cayley 
Can you sketch in for me what you think happened 
between the Stockholm conference, "Limits to Growth" 
era and the Brundtland Commission? How did the 
environment-development discussion evolve over that 
period, as you understand it? 
David Brooks 
Essentially what happened, what was formalized by the 
Brundtland Report was a shift of cause and effect. At 
the time of the Stockholm meeting, the emphasis was on 
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what the economy could do to the environment. That is 
as you grew, you were going to have adverse effects o 
the environment. In effect, it was the formalization of 
the need for a, let's say, environment impact assessment. 
It doesn't ask much about what you're doing. It says, 
whatever you're going to do, just do it better, from an 
environmental perspective. By the time of the 
Brundtland Commission, for a variety of reasons, but in 
both developed and developing countries, we'd suddenly 
realized it's not the economy that's affecting the 
environment, it's the environment that's affecting the 
economy. We had flipped the whole thing around and 
people were realizing we had to ask not only how to 
make marginal adjustments in the system, but where was 
the system going? How big could it get? 
David Cayley 
What was it that had flipped the discussion around? 
David Brooks 
A couple of things. One was essentially the failure of 
development, the recognition in the poorest countries 
that they were limited by environment, that as their 
environment deteriorated, because of naive attempts at 
development, they were in fact worse off. Second, th 
global issues had become more apparent. No one could 
avoid by that time, no one who was working on these 
issues could be unaware of the problems in the oceans, 
of the growing concentrations of gases in the 
atmosphere, of the effects of desertification, 
deforestation. They were now global phenomena. 
There is simply not enough room in the available 
carbon-dioxide space, we might say, in the atmosphere, 
for developing nations. We have to reduce the amount 
of environmental space we're taking up in the world, in 
order to let developing nations take up a little bit of 
theirs. I think it's that kind of trade-off that is implicit 
in the notion of sustainable development. 
David Cayley 
For you sustainable development is a paradigm shift. 








it's a paradigm shift because what is important is no 
longer economic growth, but development in the sense 
that Herman Daly uses the term, which is a realization 
of potential. It's a quality concept. In effect, we shift 
the emphasis from per capita gross domestic product or 
per capita monetary income, or something of this kind, 
to quality of life. 
David Cayley 
Have the big organizations that have adopted sustainable 
development in fact undergone a paradigm shift or have 
they simply put the concept on the letterhead? 
David Brooks 
Neither one nor the other. It would be saying too little 
to say they've just put it on the letterhead, but it would 
be saying an awful lot too much to suggest it's a 
paradigm shift. No, I think what's happened is that 
they've caught up with 1972 or 1972 has caught up with 
them. Most of the organizations that are adopting 
sustainable development have added environment to what 
they otherwise would have done. They aren't 
questioning yet what the meaning of development is. 
And very few organizations are, but it would be a 
mistake to discount the changes that we are seeing. For 
me they don't go far enough. I think for most 
environmentalists they don't go far enough. 
Environmental impact assessment is a very important 
step and it'll move from projects to groups of projects, 
it'll move to country assessments, to policy assessments, 
and at each stage we'll be bringing more and more in. 
You take those gains. You don't pretend that they're the 
answer, but they are very important. There are very 
few of these steps that are counterproductive. 
David Cayley 
There is another view, which I associate with a group 
that I would call conservative in this debate. The one 
who has, I think, been the most interesting to me, if not 
influential, is Ivan Illich, who defined development 
nearly thirty years ago as the war on subsistence. He set 
tradition and culture against development and saw 
development basically eroding culture, eroding people's 
capacity to cope and to deal with their environment as 
they have traditionally done so. Now for that point of 
view, I think sustainable development is 
counterproductive. It isn't just one inadequate step on 
the road to reform, but it's something completely 
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different, something more sinister. It's a further 
colonization of culture by economics and ... 
David Brooks 
I think there are other people like Vandana Shiva ... 
David Cayley 





How do you see that? 
David Brooks 
It's a very important perspective. It's one that I agree 
with on the one hand and don't agree with on the other 
hand. Certainly the protection of subsistence options, 
the protection of cultural diversity, is critically important 
and there are many things we can do to promote it. The 
problem is we often don't have the land space. We 
often don't have the ecological room to do those things. 
I would take the arguments of Illich and Shiva and 
Goldsmith very seriously. It means that you probably 
make development projects, even sustainable 
development, even what I would think of as good 
development, as small as you possibly can. You give as 
much of the control as possible to the community, but 
the community is not going to be uniform. I don't want 
to fall into the trap or be seeming to fall into the trap of 
making rural life in villages seem like some kind of ideal 
and I think some of these authors sometimes do. I 
remember Ivan Illich's book extolling the virtues of the 
bicycle. I don't think he's travelled around Winnipeg 
very much in January. And similarly, life in many 
villages was pretty difficult. It was not easy, even for 
those groups, women and children, ethnic communities, 
that are often the focus of the objections to conventional 
development. The balance isn't easy and it's not simple 
and there are no general rules. 
David Cayley 
If you take Vandana Shiva's work, let's say, I don't 
understand her as saying that this life was easy. What 
I understand her as saying is that the alternative that was 
proffered to people was no alternative. It didn't actually 
exist, this neutral, secular, degendered space that was 
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supposed to open up before people. In fact it was a 
mirage. So what happened, and I think this was also 
what Illich meant by calling development "a war on 
subsistence," he meant that what would be the result 
would be what he called "modernized poverty." I think 
neither writer denies people the right to choose their 
path. 
David Brooks 
Yes, I think they're saying that the development that 
they were seeing not only restricted options for people, 
rather than opening them, but in fact it took the most 
vulnerable members of society and made them even 
more vulnerable. Again, I think the objects of 
sustainability, when you start, to take sustainable 
development in its broader concept, not the one that 
focuses just on natural resources, what has been good 
development, the kinds of development that focused on 
people, then I think the options are there for differences. 
David Cayley 
The question that I want to raise then is what is 
development? It seems to me that if you trace this term 
back, as writers like Illich have done, it comes into 
general use in the late forties with Truman, who for the 
first time identifies virtually the whole non-European 
world as underdeveloped areas. Now there are certain 
assumptions that are made at that time and seem to 
become accepted almost overnight. But the main one, it 
seems to me, is that there is some universal, 
homogeneous process that can be called development. 
Now this then goes through a whole series of 
permutations as it fails and is redefined and it fails and 
it's redefined, and it fails and it's redefined. Right? 
Now a cynic would be inclined to say why not abandon 
this misbegotten attempt to postulate some universal, 
homogeneous process called development and recognize 
that it was a failure and that in fact we can't live without 
some culturally generated notion of the good which 
directs us. 
David Brooks 
A local, culturally sensitive notion of the good does not 
seem to me to be incompatible with sustainable 
development as I understand it. 
David Cayley 
It may be incompatible with a hundred million dollars 
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from the World Bank, which ... 
David Brooks 
Absolutely. And I think as soon as you're talking in 
those terms ... that's why I said, the World Bank hasn't 
accepted the paradigm. They're still doing the same 
projects with environment ... they're smoothing out the 
edges with environment, avoiding the worst ill effects, 
but it's not sustainable development. I still don't think 
they value local knowledge. I mean a hundred million 
dollars--just the scale drowns any local ... we should be 
dealing with projects of fifty thousand and a hundred 
thousand and even CIDA can't deal with it. They want 
something in the millions. The real danger of 
development is that it assumes a common set of goals, 
probably also a common set of processes, but it also 
suggests that western scientific notions will prove to be 
what everyone's been waiting for in the developing 
world. They just don't realize it yet, so we will bring it 
to them. Obviously, anyone who's been existing for 
hundreds of thousands of years has been living in a form 
of sustainable development. Sustainable development is 
what was there. We're trying to get to a form of 
sustainable development that leaves what was there or 
level that leaves what was there, but at a sufficiently 
higher income level in some sense. It may not be higher 
monetary income, but a sufficiently higher income to 
give people real opportunities in a world that is 
increasingly crowded, that is a world of 
interconnections, and I think both some of those who 
suggest we should just withdraw from development or 
that everything can go on as before are forgetting 
number one, simply the numbers of people involved. I 
mean population is a problem. And second, how many 
of those people are living in cities? So immediately they 
have broken the links of a self-sufficient, independently 
operating society. You can't just walk away from it at 
this point and I think one of the answers to the cynics is 
what happens then? Suppose we close down all the 
multi-lateral banks and the bi-lateral aid agencies, I think 
it's a recipe for political and ultimately military conflict-- 
initially political within and ultimately military between 
north and south. 
David Cayley 
It seems to me one makes these choices as best one can. 
I think perhaps it would be good to end this whole 
discussion about development and the reason I think 







We would not then end everything that has been 
encompassed by that discussion. We would try to 
encompass it differently, with new words, new 
approaches, and I think you're saying that's what you 
want to do under the banner of sustainable development 
and I'm saying is that prudent when in fact you want to 
reject practically everything that has happened up till 
now under the name of development? Wouldn't you be 
more ... I don't want to say honest, but more revealing 
of your intention if you spoke about something other 
than sustainable development? I mean you can say with 
Daly, "I don't mean growth by development. I mean 
realization of potential." But then, like Humpty 
Dumpty, you're saying the words are going to mean 
what you want them to mean, but what they have meant 
is pretty well growth. 
David Brooks 
Development has, for many people, meant growth, but 
it's not what it really means. We're saying that they're 
the Humpty Dumpties. We're using the word in its real 
meaning and I don't deny that it's radical. That's what 
a paradigm shift implies. I would be quite happy if 
development budgets, obviously not IDRC's budget, but 
other, the real development budgets were cut 
substantially. I don't think we need to spend much on 
concrete and steel and big earth-moving equipment. 
That's where the problems have lain and yet there are 
good development projects. I've seen good CUSO 
projects; I've seen good Oxfam projects. I remember 
some water- development projects that CARE Canada 
was doing. They don't even start building anything until 
they've been in the village for a year, until people know 
what they can do with water, and what they're going to 
do and where they want the lines to go, and what it is 
that water will do for them and how they'll manage the 
water system. All of that happens before you start 
building a water system for a village. I think CARE 
Canada's model was a three-year process for each village 
and it's only the middle year that actually involves pipes 
and a little bit of concrete and some water pumps. The 
est of it is talking, discussing, and letting the 
community find out how it's going to run that thing. 
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And you can do much the same thing with local 
electrical. Electricity does not have to come in from 
wires from a central utility. We may be operating 
systems with a capacity of five to ten kilowatts just 
improving local industry, making it much more efficient. 
Now when I say efficiency, I'm introducing a western 
notion. I agree. I don't think that implies that you 
disparage local knowledge. It does imply that you are 
changing something. So the only alternative is to 
pretend that the rest of the world isn't changing and that 
you can isolate some fraction of it. 
David Cayley 
Wouldn't the alternative be to say that the rest of the 
world can change outside of our tutelage within 
something called development? 
David Brooks 
The rest of the world is changing. 
David Cayley 
Understood. What I was saying was let it change, but 
if development implies tutelage by western agencies, 
governments ... 
David Brooks 
Governments and non-government organizations ... I 
think it implies providing options, providing alternatives, 
suggesting different ways of doing things and letting the 
communities decide which of those methods to opt for, 
which of those methods to build into their system of 
operating. It's much like growing trees. Within limits, 
there's no reason not to experiment with new kinds of 
seed, with new kinds of trees. There are reasons, for 
example, to import trees from other areas and try them 
out. What's a mistake is to try them out on a large scale 
and to design systems that always favour the richer 
farmers. You can think of systems that favour the poor 
farmers, systems that can be operated with minimal 
capital and with the labour inputs that they have, and 
look for those kinds of options. Look for options that 
are efficient at small-scale, not at large-scale systems 
that work well with more rather than less labour inputs. 
But those may be somewhat different from what has 
been there before and as long as the local community has 









David Brooks of the International Development Research 
Centre. During our conversation, I alluded to a passage 
in Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking Glass in which 
Humpty Dumpty says to Alice, "When I use a word, it 
means just what I choose it to mean, neither more nor 
less." It seems to me that the difference between David 
Brooks and Wolfgang Sachs, whom you heard earlier, 
does come down to just this question. Can development 
be made to mean something entirely new or will it 
continue to mean what forty years of history have made 
it mean? This is a question not just of a word changing 
its meaning, but of a vast, international bureaucracy 
changing its practice. Whether big development 
institutions like the World Bank can change and how 
they've affected local communities up till now will be 
my subject next week when I talk to Pat Adams, the 
head of development watchdog Probe International. 
Lister Sinclair 
On Ideas tonight you've been listening to the first 
program of a four-part series called "Redefining 
Development." The series is written and presented by 
David Cayley. Production assistants: Gail Brownell and 
Faye Macpherson; archivist: Ken Puley; technical 
direction: Lorne Tulk. The executive producer of Ideas 
is Bernie Lucht. 
Lister Sinclair 
Good evening. I'm Lister Sinclair and this is Ideas. 
"Development," Jane Jacobs once said, "can't be given." 
It's an organic expression of what a society is and its 
preconditions are too complex and various to be 
conferred by one society on another. Nevertheless, for 
forty years, western societies have been trying to give 
development to the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America. During the first half of this period, 
international development was carried out with a 
crusading sense of missionary purpose. You can hear it 
in this excerpt from U.S. president Harry Truman's 
inaugural address in January 1949. 
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Harry Truman 
We must embark on a bold, new program for making 
the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial 
progress available for the improvement and growth of 
underdeveloped areas. More than half the people of the 
world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their 
food is inadequate, they are victims of disease, their 
economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty 
is a handicap and a threat, both to them and to more 
prosperous areas. I believe that we should make 
available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our 
store of technical knowledge, in order to help them 
realize their aspirations for a better life. 
Lister Sinclair 
Harry Truman's projection of international development 
as America's global mission was renewed in the early 
sixties by Jack Kennedy with his creation of the Peace 
Corps and the Alliance for Progress. But by the late 
sixties, dissenting voices began to be heard. One of the 
first was Ivan Illich. He called development a war on 
subsistence and predicted that it would undermine 
people's capacity to cope with their environments in 
traditional ways without offering a real alternative. The 
attempt to transplant western institutions, he said, would 
produce not western-style development, but social 
polarization with the majority forced into a situation of 
modernized poverty far more painful than traditional 
subsistence. During the seventies, parts of this critique 
began to be picked up by environmentalists. They 
noticed how big dams often displaced whole 
communities, how export-oriented agriculture stole the 
best lands from food production for local consumption, 
how commercial logging disrupted traditional harvesting 
of forests. By the 1980s, even the big development 
banks had to recognize the force of this critique. -In 
May 1988, World Bank president Barber Conable 
formally admitted that many World Bank projects had 
been environmentally destructive and pledged a new, 
green future for the bank. One of the people who has 
led the campaign to bring the big development 
institutions to account has been Pat Adams, the executive 
director of Toronto's Probe International. Again and 
again, she has pointed out the damage done to both 
democracy and ecology by development aid. Protecting 
the environment, she has argued, means, first of all, 




I think we must always remember that when a project is 
going to harm the global environment, it's first going to 
harm a local environment. There are always people in 
a particular area who are going to be most threatened 
and first threatened by that project. And so I think we 
have to recognize that rather than there being a 
divergence of local interest from the global interest, in 
fact there's a convergence, and if you give people at the 
local level the power and the tools to protect themselves 
and their communities, then the global economy and 
ecology will look after itself. 
Lister Sinclair 
Tonight on Ideas you'll meet Pat Adams in part two of 
our series on redefining development. The series is 
written and presented by David Cayley. 
David Cayley 
A few weeks ago, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark 
received a copy of a new book published by Probe 
International. It was called Damming the Three Gorges: 
What the Dam-Builders Don't Want You to Know. The 
book concerns a massive dam which the Chinese 
government proposes to build on the Yangtse River, a 
dam which will require the relocation of more than a 
million people. The fourteen-million-dollar feasibility 
study for the project was financed by CIDA, the 
Canadian International Development Agency, supervised 
by the World Bank, and conducted in secret by a 
consortium of Canadian utilities and engineering 
consultants, including B.C. and Quebec Hydro. The 
consortium made a thirteen-volume study, which 
endorsed the project. Only a summary was released to 
the public. Probe International immediately petitioned 
for the release of the entire study and, after prolonged 
wrangling, received a somewhat censored version of it 
in April of 1989. Probe then invited ten internationally 
recognized experts to make an independent evaluation of 
the corsortium study. This resulted in the volume 
forwarded to Joe Clark. It roundly condemmed the 
feasibility study, both on the grounds of conflict of 
interest -- members of the consortium would be in line 
for contracts if the dam proceeded -- and of negligence 
in the assessment of the dam's human and environmental 
consequences. The consortium's study, said one of the 
book's' contributors, Doctor Vaclav Smil of the 
University of Manitoba, was neither engineering nor 
science, but "an expert prostitution, paid for by 
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Canadian taxpayers." "We regretfully conclude," said 
Probe International's director, Pat Adams, in her 
accompanying letter to Joe Clark, "that the Canadian 
government's commitment to sustainable development 
and to respect for the rights of third-world citizens is 
hollow." The attack on the Three Gorges dam and on 
CIDA's role in bringing it nearer fruition is typical of 
the work of Probe International, which describes itself as 
a public-interest research group, monitoring the effects 
of Canadian aid and trade policies on the people of the 
third world. Pat Adams is the executive director. She 
believes that, through the efforts of organizations like 
Probe, development aid is now questioned much more 
seriously by the public than it once was. 
Pat Adams 
I think there has been quite a transition over the last ten 
years from a general acceptance and support for the 
development aid agencies and the concept of 
development in the third world to improve the standards 
of living of people in the third world and I would say, 
over the last decade, there has been a loss of innocence. 
I think the public in the first world and in the donor 
countries in the developed world has started to see 
development for what it is. And one of the things that 
made the difference was that we started receiving some 
very, very nifty-gritty details of the implications, both 
environmental and human implications and consequences 
of these very, very large development projects, which 
were being designed in the capital cities of the industrial 
countries and in the borrowing third-world countries as 
well. And it was really this amassing of a huge amount 
of evidence of development projects that had gone awry 
and the reason that they are going awry is because they 
are not consistent with the wishes and the choices for the 
kind of life-styles and use of physical resources that 
people in the third world want to make. You know, I 
think we have to recognize that most third-world 
governments are not elected by their people and, 
therefore, when they choose a project, such as a hydro- 
electric dam or a road-building scheme, we should not 
automatically assume that that is the choice of the 
people. In fact, we should assume the opposite because 
there are no checks and balances, or very few, in these 
countries to ensure that the projects that are chosen are 
really the choices of the people. So it was really the 
collection of a huge amount of information and there was 
another significant thing that happened and that was the 
improvement in communication technology. More and 
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more groups in the third world, really citizens' rights 
groups, who were either defending communities because 
of the environmental consequences of a project that they 
were facing, or the social consequences or the economic 
consequences, would find us. They would find us 
somehow. They would organize themselves, they would 
try to fight these projects, and then they would say, now 
it's Canada that's financing this project. Who in Canada 
can help us? They, of course, realized that we were in 
part responsible for these projects and they found us. 
They found us through the churches, they found us 
through conferences, they found us through friends of 
theirs who happened to travel. They found whatever 
way they could to communicate with us. And for thirty- 
five years the development institutions, institutions like 
CIDA, the Canadian International Development Agency, 
the World Bank, have been able to spend money in other 
countries without us knowing what the consequences 
were, because we couldn't communicate with the people. 
And that changed in the last decade. All of a sudden we 
started to get a lot of information about the consequences 
and we've realized that there are grass-roots citizens' 
groups all over the third world that are just like the 
environmental groups and the citizens' groups in this 
country who are trying to defend their communities from 
unwanted development, from unwanted investments in 
the use of their resources. They want to make the 
choices, just as any Canadians would want to make the 
choices about how our own environment is used. 
David Cayley 
In 1985, Pat Adams and her colleague Lawrence 
Solomon brought out a book about what they were 
learning, called In the Name of Progress: The Underside 
of Foreign Aid. The book pointed overwhelmingly to 
the corrupting effects of development assistance and the 
way in which foreign sponsorship has allowed 
governments to ignore the wishes of their own people 
and commit follies they could never otherwise have 
afforded. Pat Adams is now working on a second study 
called Environment Held Hostage: How Debt Is Affecting 
the Third World. 
Pat Adams 
Gustavo Esteva, who I heard speak at a conference in 
Tunisia a couple of years ago, made a comment. He 
said, "In Mexico, we have really been enjoying the debt 
crisis." And of course that really caught the attention of 
everybody and everyone's jaws dropped, but a number 
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of us who were listening to him, who have worked ire 
the environmental movement and have been fighting a 
lot of these big aid and so-called development projects, 
understood what he was talking about. I mean, it struck 
a chord with us, and he said that, essentially, money 
dried up when the debt crisis hit, banks were not 
prepared to lend more money to third-world 
governments, and that brought to a halt a number of 
very disastrous, so-called development projects. And 
sure enough, this is what the environmental community 
had been recognizing. I mean for years we have been 
fighting ill-conceived, ill-considered development 
projects, such as hydro-electric dams in very sensitive 
areas that forceably resettle hundreds of thousands of 
people. The nuclear-power expansion program in 
Mexico, for example, was also cancelled because of the 
debt crisis. They managed to finish two of their 
reactors, but just barely, and they cancelled a massive 
program that they had planned on embarking on. 
Hydro-electric dams all over the world were put on 
hold; road-building schemes, logging operations were 
cancelled, because there wasn't enough money to finance 
them. And I think what Gustavo Esteva said was 
something that we had 'all recognized but hadn't really 
articulated, which was that money is power. And whet 
you lend money, when your commercial banks or your 
government lends money to another government, it gives 
them the power to use resources in a certain way and it 
gives them a great deal of independence from their own 
people. And this is something that the astro-physicist, 
the well-known civil-rights leader from China, Fang 
Lizhi said: that when his government, the Chinese 
government, is lent money from the outside world, it 
gives his government the power to be independent from 
the Chinese people. His government does not have to 
rely on the Chinese people in order to extract money to 
finance a lot of these big projects, and that's why he, for 
example, has called for a halt to all World Bank lending, 
all foreign-aid lending, except in the area of education, 
because he too articulated the same principle that 
Gustavo Esteva did and our colleagues in Brazil have 
articulated, which is that money is power, and when we 
lend money to their governments, we give their 
governments power against their own people. And for 
that reason, groups in Brazil, for example, have said to 
us, "Look, we appreciate your good will, we appreciate 
the principles and the concept behind foreign aid, we 
appreciate that you want to help us, but, quite frankly. 
what you are doing is you're financing our government 
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against us, so please just keep your money." And this 
came as a real shock to us, I think, at the beginning of 
this decade, and over the decade we've seen how money 
can be misused, and I think this is really what has 
changed the attitude towards the development institution, 
the institution of channelling what is now forty-five 
billion dollars a year to the third world. 
David Cayley 
I know you're working now on a history of the debt 
crisis. How did the spending bonanza that led to the 
debt crisis come about in the first place? 
Pat Adams 
There are a number of theories and the main reason I 
think that is recognized by everybody is that there was 
a massive re-ordering of surplus cash at the time of the 
oil crisis. What happened was the OPEC countries all 
of a sudden found themselves holding an awful lot of 
foreign exchange, which, of course, was being paid to 
them for their oil by countries like the U.S., all of 
western Europe, Japan, and of course the third world. 
So there was this huge chunk of money that all of a 
sudden found its way into the hands of OPEC member 
countries. They wanted to do something, of course, 
with the money, so they deposited it in the commercial 
banking system. The commercial banks then found 
themselves with an awful lot of money, and they, when 
they accept money as deposits, they then have to lend it 
out again, and so they did. They lent it out to the 
countries who were extremely short of foreign exchange 
and those were the countries in the third world. Now to 
what extent there was official encouragement from 
institutions like the World Bank, the U.S. government, 
the Canadian government, western European 
governments, we don't really know for sure. It's very 
difficult to sort that out, although certainly bank 
presidents, such as Mr. Ritchie from the Bank of Nova 
Scotia, have said that there was sort of a wink-and-a- 
nod, were the words that he used, that the commercial 
banking system got from governments in the western 
countries to make sure that this money got into the hands 
of the countries who were very cash-short and those 
were the third-world countries. So they embarked on an 
extraordinary, massive lending program, channelling 
billions of dollars to governments, many of which were 
military governments, almost none of which were elected 
y their people and over which the people in the third 
-world had no control. In Brazil, the Brazilian congress 
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is now trying to track down the contracts for these loans 
that were made with commercial banks. They can't even 
get the contracts. You know, these governments were 
extremely unaccountable and of course the people in the 
third world, if they dared ask the question, "How much 
money are you borrowing and what are you doing with 
it?" they were very likely to end up in jail. So we can 
understand why they didn't ask those questions. So they 
had no idea what money was being borrowed in their 
name, as it was. 
David Cayley 
And what turned this lending into what we now call the 
debt crisis? At what point did it begin to be perceived 
as a crisis and why? 
Pat Adams 
Well, the crisis hit in 1982, August 12th, when the 
finance minister in Mexico phoned the head of the IMF, 
the federal reserve in the U.S., and said, "We're 
bankrupt. We can't pay our bills." And then the whole 
world really came crashing down. I think it was at that 
point that all of the banks realized how terribly 
vulnerable they were to a couple of countries in Latin 
America. They had lent out far more than they ever 
should have and their own financial viability was 
threatened if these countries could not continue to pay 
the money back. And indeed that's precisely what 
happened. So a number of rescue operations were 
organized by the IMF and they managed to get enough 
cash back into the hands of the Brazilian government, 
the Mexican government, the Argentinian government, 
so that they could continue to pay their bills. But at this 
point it was not new money. It was just new money was 
being lent in order to pay back old bills. So it was just 
a very elaborate recycling process that was going on and 
it was especially designed to keep calm in the 
international financial markets. 
David Cayley 
Pat Adams considers the debt crisis an environmental 
boon, because it has slowed down big development 
projects. In seeing development itself as the primary 
cause of environmental destruction, she dissents from the 
current conventional wisdom of, say, the Brundtland 
Commission. Brundtland argued that poverty is the 
main cause of environmental degradation and, therefore, 





Most of the environmental damage that has been done in 
the third world, I would say in the last thirty, forty 
years, but especially in the last twenty years, has been 
caused by massive projects, such as hydro-electric dams, 
such as road-building schemes, cattle-ranching 
operations, agricultural schemes, that were financed with 
foreign money. Now the development institutions like 
the World Bank and CIDA really prefer to describe the 
environmental problem in the third world as being a 
consequence of poverty. I disagree with that. I don't 
think that the poor naturally destroy their environment. 
In fact, I think what has caused the destruction of the 
environment is very, very bad projects, but also really 
unsustainable economic policies. For example, in 
Brazil, there was a credit program for the agricultural 
sector which encouraged farmers to borrow money from 
the government at very low interest rates to purchase 
land with and then because of land-tenure regulations 
clear the land in order to establish ownership of it, and 
most of that land was in the Amazon. This was 
something that was very expensive to the government. 
They could only finance it as long as they got 
international financing for it and it encouraged a massive 
destruction of the Amazon rainforest. There were other 
projects as well. For example, the Balbina hydro- 
electric dam in Brazil, designed with help from a 
Canadian engineering firm, Montreal Engineering. They 
identified a site in the Amazon that has turned out to be 
a very bad site for a hydro-electric dam. It was not only 
a very flat area, but it turned out to have a couple of 
rather deep river valleys as well as ravines, which 
caused havoc when they eventually closed the floodgates 
and started to fill the reservoir. And apparently what the 
engineers did was they flew over the area to be dammed 
and they used aerial photographs to measure the top of 
the rainforest canopy and then they assumed a certain 
height of tree and then assumed that therefore that 
determined the topography underneath the forest canopy. 
Well, what they didn't know was they didn't know how 
the rainforest worked and they didn't realize that indeed 
the top of the forest canopy was hiding a bunch of these 
very, very deep ravines. Well, time came, they closed 
the floodgates for the dam and the water started to back 
up and what it did was it created a series of canals and 
the water flowed into these little ravines and created a 
series, in fact, fifteen hundred hilltops and, of course, 
the water spread everywhere and it spread to a much 
larger area than they ever expected. Now on these 
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hilltops the animals from the rainforest sought refuge 
and one of the residents described it as a most horrible 
scene. The animals who found themselves on these 
hilltops didn't have enough room and started to die and 
this resident described it as absolutely horrible and said 
that it was corpses on top of corpses on top of corpses. 
So that was just the beginning. Once they closed the 
floodgates, they also had not cleared the area of the trees 
and the vegetation that would now be under the reservoir 
and the decomposing vegetation caused the development 
of an oxygen deficiency, which led to the death of all the 
fish in the river. Not only did it do that, but it turned 
the water very acidic, so that the populations that lived 
around the reservoir now found themselves with 
intestinal disorders, skin rashes, vomiting, and there was 
a break-out of malaria, because often when you create 
very large bodies of water that are stagnant, then it 
creates a perfect breeding ground for mosquitos, which 
are the vector for malaria. So the ultimate insult of this 
project was that it cannot generate the electricity that 
they expected it would generate in the first place, 
because there wasn't enough water to go through the 
turbines to generate the electricity. Now the irony in all 
of this is that in 1985 an IMF, an International Monetary 
Fund austerity program, and an austerity agreement that 
they had reached with the Brazilian government had led 
the Brazilian government to cancel the Balbina dam. It 
was not completed until 1987. But the governor of the 
state of Amazonas, where the dam was located, objected 
strenuously, contacted the president of Brazil, and said, 
"I want this dam to go ahead," and there was, I gather, 
a great debate, and President Sarney eventually agreed 
that it would'be exempt from the IMF austerity program. 
Now the IMF is the institution that the world loves to 
hate because it does require these austerity programs 
from third-world governments. But austerity programs 
are not always necessarily bad. In many cases, the 
money has been spent on projects that are not in any 
way sustainable, either economically or environmentally, 
and I think we have to take that into account. 
David Cayley 
So you're saying that essentially the debt crisis and the 
drying up of new money stopped a lot of projects that 
would have been damaging, but isn't there another side 
to it, that the hardship imposed on the countries created 




Yes. That is certainly true and there are cases, for 
example, in Ecuador, where the logging regulations were 
relaxed specifically so that more logs could be exported, 
so that more foreign exchange could be earned, so that 
they could continue to pay off their foreign debt. 
There's no doubt about it that the debt crisis has hurt the 
environment in some respects. Also in Ecuador, for 
example, oil exploration has been carried on at great cost 
to the tropical rainforest and to the native people who 
count that as their home. There's certainly no doubt 
about it. At the same time, I have discussed this with 
colleagues in Brazil and I have asked what would happen 
if there were no debt crisis, would the Carajas mining 
operation in the northeastern part of the Brazilian 
Amazon, which is a massively destructive mining 
operation that's destroying about fifty-eight thousand 
square kilometres of tropical rainforest, would a project 
like that not go ahead if there were no debt to be paid 
back? And they thought about it, and they said, "No, it 
probably would go ahead, because our government wants 
to export minerals, logs, whatever we can export in 
order to earn foreign exchange, because then they want 
o import goods with that foreign exchange."' So I think 
that there's always going to be the desire amongst 
several governments, all governments for that matter, to 
earn foreign exchange, and they will sell off whatever 
they can of their country's assets in order to earn that 
foreign exchange. And the only way to restrict them 
from doing that is really to empower the people whose 
resources are being pirated. That's the only thing that 
will stop governments and that's true of all governments, 
not just third-world governments, but our governments 
as well. 
David Cayley 
So you're saying for example in Africa or Central 
America, where lands have been taken for export crops 
and subsistence has been injured by that, that you think 
that probably would have happened anyway under 








That's right. And it was happening before the debt. 
Indeed, that's where the debt came from. The money 
that was borrowed was borrowed to invest in hydro- 
electric dams, so they could mine the bauxite, so they 
could process it into aluminum, so they could export it 
for more foreign exchange. The problem came in that 
the money was borrowed for projects that were not 
carefully considered. You know, on paper they sort of 
looked okay, but we've managed to get a few of those 
papers in the last ten years, we've managed to get a few 
of those feasibility studies, and we've realized that the 
emperor has no clothes, that these projects never made 
sense from the beginning. And that's where the debt 
came from and we have to recognize that. If we turned 
the taps back on, if we could do away with the debt 
today, and turn the tap of money back on, I can 
guarantee that in ten or twenty years there would be a 
new debt crisis, because that's where it came from. 
David Cayley 
A lot of people are calling for forgiving the debt as a 
way to get development back on track, the way to solve, 
say, the crisis of Africa. What do you think, in more 
detail,. would be the consequences of debt forgiveness? 
Pat Adams 
I have no problem with debt forgiveness. I think that 
probably the vast majority of today's 1.3 trillion dollar 
debt that the third world owes to us was contracted 
under fraudulent circumstances. And I think it is really 
outrageous that the people of the third world were never 
party to these contracts, never had the means of due 
process to control their governments, and so on, before 
they embarked on these contracts. I think, in principle, 
for that reason, that they should not be expected to be 
responsible for these debts. However, if we did away 
with the current debt and could somehow conjure up lots 
of new money, as many of the development institutions 
are calling for, there are no guarantees that the money 
would be spent any better today than it was spent twenty 
years ago. A lot of the money would go into the same 
crazy projects that made no economic sense, that hurt 
the environment, that destroyed the environment of 
millions of people, and, ultimately, it is usually money 
that is lent--it's not a grant--and the people of the third 
world would once again have to pay that money back. 
As long as there are no democratic checks and balances 
that a people can have over their government, there's no 
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guarantee that our loans to them are either going to be 
properly spent or put in the right kinds of investments. 
David Cayley 
You've written about the debt crisis. I remember a 
piece in The Globe and Mail, maybe a year ago now, in 
which you spoke openly about the fact that the debt 
crisis may have done a lot of good, in a sense. It may 
have stopped a lot of bad things from happening in any 
event. I gather that you've created a lot of controversy 
by that stand. What's been the nature of the 
controversy?. 
Pat Adams 
Well, the controversy has been, I think, unthinking, and 
I also think missed the point. The fact that the debt 
crisis has stopped ill-considered projects that destroy 
environments, destroy the livelihoods of people, is really 
a perverse consequence of the debt. To use the debt 
situation to control the expenditure and investment of 
money is a crazy way to do it. Far better ways are to 
use democratic mechanisms to control the way 
governments borrow and spend money. But the fact 
remains when you have so many governments which-are 
unaccountable to their people, cutting off money to them, 
in fact restricts their ability to invest in very damaging 
projects. Now that is not to defend the debt as a way of 
controlling these investments. It is a consequence. We 
just have to accept that that is the result. But there's a 
very important lesson in that and that is that money is 
power and that if we're going to lend money to 
governments, we have to say to those governments, 
"Demonstrate to us that this investment is consistent with 
the wishes of your people." 
David Cayley 
But how on earth could such an assurance ever be given 
or gained? I mean, what if the government of Brazil 
were contemplating lending money to Canada for the 
James Bay hydro-electric phase two? Would they judge 
that the people of Canada wish that to happen, or would 
they look at the fact that the people who are going to be 
flooded out don't wish it to happen? 
Pat Adams 
Yes. You raise a very important point. I think that 
what we have to start by doing is not setting elaborate 
review procedures for these mega-projects, which go on 
in this country and in the third world, but we have to 
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start by recognizing the primary rights of people in all 
of our countries of the world. In the case of the James 
Bay, the Cree are participating in federal and provincial 
review procedures because they have to, not because 
they want to. As far as they are concerned, it is their 
land. And as far as they're concerned, this should not 
be a subject for discussion, as I understand their 
position. As far as they're concerned, they don't want 
the project to go ahead and therefore it should not be a 
matter for discussion by any review hearing. And I 
think that we have to do the same thing for people in the 
third world. We have to, for example, start by 
recognizing that you cannot forceably resettle 
communities, ever. If a community wants to move and 
sell their land to a utility so that they can flood it with a 
hydro-electric dam, well, okay. But the point is that we 
have to recognize the land rights, we have to recognize 
the property rights of citizens all over the world. And 
when we start to recognize those rights, then they will 
start to protect the environment. There's a very 
interesting and tragic case in India, a site called 
Singrauli, which is the site for what may be one of the 
world's largest energy and industrial plans. There are 
twelve open-pit coal mines, there are coal-fired 
electricity generating stations, and this industrial 
program has essentially devastated the community. For 
generations it was a heavily forested area. There were 
lots of wild animals on which the people in the area 
depended for their protein. It was a very prosperous 
farming community. And then along came the Indian 
government and its electric utility and said, "Well, we're 
going to create a reservoir here and then we're going to 
put all these coal-fired electricity generating stations 
around and put in all these open-pit coal mines," and 
within a decade the community has been destroyed, the 
area has been deforested, and it has now been described 
by the Indian press as equivalent to the lower circles of 
Dante's inferno. What has essentially happened is that 
coal ash has spread around the community. It's landed 
on agricultural land, creating a sort of cement-like 
substance which made growing crops very difficult. The 
women and children in this community have been forced 
to take jobs with the electric utility and they work at half 
the state wages. They work for twelve hours a day, and 
the incidence of death from respiratory illnesses is 
extremely high. The canal that feeds the coal generating 
stations leaks, it's damaged agricultural lands. It has 
essentially been a disaster. It is, as the people there 
have described it, hell on earth. The world talks with 
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great fear about what are we going to do when India and 
when China start to use more and more coal to meet 
their energy needs. We discuss these countries as if they 
have this insatiable desire to exploit the global commons 
and to destroy the world's environment. Well, that's 
nonsense. I think we must always remember that when 
a project is going to harm the global environment, it's 
first going to harm a local environment. There are 
always people in a particular area who are going to be 
most threatened, and first threatened by that project. In 
the case of Singrali, we had a community of five 
hundred thousand people who had been shuttled around 
and resettled and sometimes resettled over and over 
again just to make way for these projects, who are now 
suffering from death and illnesses caused by the 
development scheme. They were the world's first line 
of defense and yet their rights were not recognized. 
They had no right to defend themselves. They had no 
right to say, "No, we don't want an open-pit coal mine 
here, we want to carry on with our agricultural 
lifestyles. No, we don't want a coal-fired generating 
system here, because that's going to give us respiratory 
illnesses," and so on. They didn't have the right to say 
chat. They just had to live with it. And had they had 
the right, had their property rights been recognized, had 
their environmental rights been recognized, not only 
would their community have been saved, but the world's 
environment would have been better off. The Singrauli 
site is one of the largest point sources of C02 emissions 
in the world. And so I think we have to recognize that 
rather than there being a divergence of local interests 
from the global interest, in fact, there's a convergence. 
And if you give people at the local level the power and 
the tools to protect themselves and their communities, 
then the global economy and ecology will look after 
itself. 
David Cayley 
I believe you. But if you carry local autonomy to that 
point, would there be any economic development at all 
in the world? Can't you almost always identify 
somebody locally whose ox is being gored in any such 
development? 
Pat Adams 
No. I think what would happen is ... I believe that 
human beings and communities are always changing. I 
Mink people are naturally innovative; different 
communities change at different paces, some 
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communities don't want to change at all. And we all 
know the Mennonite communities and so on and they 
make a conscious, collective decision not to change. 
And that's fine--they're perfectly within their rights to 
do that. And then there are other communities and 
individuals who may want to change it. What societies 
have to do, and communities, is establish a decision- 
making procedure that protects the rights of each one of 
them individually and protects their rights as a 
community. When they have those tools, then some 
changes will occur, some innovations will be made. To 
my mind, that's what development is. Development is 
not when a government backs a corporation that comes 
in and says, "We want to put in a coal plant here," or, 
"We want to put in a hydro-electric dam here and we 
have the right to make that decision, how to use your 
land." That's not development. That's assault, but 
that's not development. And that's what has been 
happening for the last thirty years in the case of the third 
world. It's outsiders from Washington, from Ottawa, 
from the capital cities, who have been making decisions 
about how to use somebody else's environment. Well, 
you can't expect accountable decision-making when the 
people who make the decisions don't have to live with 
the consequences, not only the physical consequences 
and the environmental consequences, but the financial 
consequences as well. It's not an accountable system. 
There has been a total breakdown in accountability in the 
development process. Another example of that would be 
the case with Toronto garbage. As long as Toronto can 
find another community to take our problem, then 
there's no pressure on us to deal with our own problems, 
and as long as we can dump our radioactive waste on 
some other community, we never have to come to grips 
with the consequences of living with that. So that's why 
you have to set up accountable decisions. You know, 
take the case of Toronto garbage. I think if the city of 
Toronto said, "Okay, sorry, citizens, we're not going to 
pick up your garbage anymore," you would see a 
dramatic change overnight. You would see two and a 
half million citizens walking into supermarkets with 
plastic bags or paper bags or old yogurt containers and 
saying, "I'm sorry, I've brought my own containers. I 
don't want to purchase the stuff in all this packaging. " 
You would see a dramatic change very quickly, because 
we would be forced to live with our own garbage. And 
when you're forced to live with your own mistakes and 
your own problems, then all of a sudden there's this 
wonderful innovation and people find solutions. People 
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will always find solutions. It's just that we have to have 
limits. We have to have limits placed on our activities 
and we have to have the rights of other communities 
respected. 
David Cayley 
This view seems to have gained you some sort of a 
reputation of a right-winger. Why do you think that is? 
Is it because you see solutions in law, in property rights, 
in well-established institutions, rather than through the 
creation of new service bureaucracies to address new 
environmental needs? It seems to me your solutions are 
always essentially simple and already available, although 
very radical in what they imply, and that we are now on 
the threshold of an era of environmental services, where 
development enters a whole new phase. It seems. to me 
that you're fundamentally going against that grain Nvith 
what you're saying. 
Pat Adams 
I think that our solutions are essentially decentralized. 
Our solutions are to put power into the hands of 
individuals and individuals as they want to organize 
themselves into communities. And when you do that 
you have to give up power. You have to say, "I don't 
want a central government making these decisions. I 
want local communities making these decisions." And 
that is in some cases not consistent with the conventional 
left wing. It's not autarchy, it's really decentralized 
decision-making and I think it's based on a respect for 
the good judgement of the average person. But in order 
to accept that, you have to accept that power is going to 
be devolved from a central government or from a central 
body. I think that frightens a lot of people. I think a lot 
of people feel as Eugene Black, who was an early 
president of the World Bank, felt, that the average 
person cannot make good decisions themselves, that 
there have to be these development diplomats and that 
they have to align themselves with the elites in third- 
world countries, because only they can figure out what 
is best for the people of that country. And to save the 
people of that country from themselves, they're going to 
have these experts making decisions for them. What 
we're saying is that the best expert is the person who has 
to live with the consequences of a decision and once you 
make those people accountable and you also give them 
the tools available, make them available to them, to 
develop their own communities themselves, then you 
will start to have sound decisions. You know, I think a 
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pulp mill, for example, which wants to establish itself or 
a river will have to seek the approval of all of the peopl 
in that river basin who are going to be affected by that 
pulp mill and I dare say that they will have great 
difficulty doing it. 
David Cayley 
Do you think that there could be a pulp mill under your 
scenario? 
Pat Adams 
Under the current circumstances, I doubt it, because I 
don't think the technology has been developed to do it, 
but once corporations know their limits, once they know 
that they're not going to be able to put these projects in 
place because it's not going to be acceptable to the local 
community, they will find alternatives. But as long as 
they're not obliged to find alternatives, they won't. As 
long as the people of Toronto can push their garbage 
onto somebody else, we will. It's these limits which 
have to be established. We have to lose our ability to 
create poisons for other people. 
David Cayley 
I like that way of putting it very much. You've beer 
involved with a whole campaign to identify the human 
and the ecological costs of big development projects, and 
I suppose when the World Bank cancelled the so-called 
second power sector loan to Brazil, that was at least a 
symbolic moment in which you won an important 
victory. The bank itself acknowledged the case against 
the big hydro-electric scheme as it then existed in Brazil. 
What can happen now? Is a green World Bank a 
contradiction in terms? What can come out of this 
conjuncture? 
Pat Adams 
The World Bank is doing a very good job painting itself 
green. They are churning out an awful lot of rhetoric 
and they now are embarking on what they call the green 
fund, which is going to be about four hundred million 
dollars, from which they will fund so-called ecological 
projects. Now I think that it is impossible for the World 
Bank to be a green institution because the World Bank 
is a multi-lateral institution, is accountable to the people 
in no one country. So, for example, if they propose a 
project, say it's a hydro-electric dam, they may or may 
not do an environmental assessment. If they do one 
they are not obliged to release it to the public or to peer 
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Pfor peer scrutiny. Now that means they can get away 
with murder. They can get away with whatever they 
want. They can say, "Oh, we've done an environmental 
assessment and we have decided after doing this 
assessment that this project is sound and we're going to 
go ahead with it." Not only that, but they are not 
obliged to discuss the issue with the people who are 
going to be affected by the project and certainly they're 
a long way from ever giving these people a prior right 
to make the decision. So there's no way to make sure 
that their decisions are consistent with the choices and 
the wishes of the people in the third world. To give you 
an example of some of the problems that can emerge 
from this, the Canadian government financed a fourteen- 
million-dollar feasibility study for the Three Gorges dam 
in China and the World Bank was also involved in 
preparing it and making sure that it adhered to proper 
standards. Well, we managed through the Canadian 
access to information act to get a copy of it eventually, 
after a year and a half. We have just done a review of 
it. We sent it out to nine experts around the world, who 
have gone through it with a fine-tooth comb, and we 
have established and, I think, illustrated that there is just 
P_ extraordinary display of professional negligence in the 
preparation of this document. The consultants admit that 
the views of the people in the Three Gorges river valley 
on the Yangtse River who would be displaced by this 
project -- up to 1.2 million people -- their views are not 
so well-known about this project, but never mind, 
everybody will be happy. You know, it's okay to 
resettle this number of people. And there are numerous 
other flaws that are extremely distressing in the analysis 
of the potential for increased earthquake activity, in the 
potential for increased flooding, and so on. When you 
look at this document in detail, you realize that the 
corporations who were preparing the assessment have a 
real interest in seeing the dam proceed, because then 
they have a very good chance of getting the contracts to 
build the dam. So there's a very serious conflict of 
interest here and that leads to extremely flawed analysis. 
Now as long as this analysis is secret, there's no way to 
expose it. It's very difficult to illustrate how their 
interests are compromised. 
David Cayley 
The green fund that you mentioned, what would 
constitute an ecological project, as you imagine it? What 
Wotentially would be the uses of this money? 
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Pat Adams 
One potential use would be reforestation and that, of 
course, is very dangerous because, whether you cut a 
tree or you plant a tree, you are affecting somebody's 
environment, and as one of our colleagues in India, Anil 
Agarwal, who's a well-known environmentalist there, 
has said that the aid institutions are very good at planting 
the wrong trees in the wrong places for the wrong 
reasons for the wrong people. And the most common 
reforestation programs are these massive eucalyptus 
monocultures which are popping up all over India, 
places like Thailand as well. Eucalyptus is not only very 
environmentally destructive, it actually absorbs a great 
deal of water, tends to really deprive agricultural 
communities of available water, chokes out agricultural 
crops, is not available, not acceptable to animals so you 
can't use it as forage, and so on. It's a very quick- 
growing tree and it's been primarily grown for the 
cellulose. So planting a tree can be just as damaging, as 
I say, as cutting down a tree and whenever you tamper 
with somebody's environment, whether you call it a 
green project or an environmental project or not, is 
irrelevant. The point is the people who are going to be 
affected have to be able to decide yes or no. Do they 
want their environment to be used this way? 
David Cayley 
I have a feeling that in your ideal commonwealth there 
is simply no room for this huge, international 
bureaucracy, that they can by definition do no good. 
Pat Adams 
Well, there are a bunch of rules that they should adhere 
to and I think it's going to be difficult for them to 
adhere to them, but I think, if they want to continue to 
exist, they have to, otherwise they're going to continue 
to finance very destructive projects at the expense of 
millions of people and at the expense of their treasuries, 
which is very dangerous. I think the international 
institutions look at public opinion, and they say, "Ah, 
public opinion is green now. Therefore, how can we be 
green?" And the only thing they know how to do is 
spend money, but as long as they try to spend money in 
ways that are not accountable to the people who are 
affected, it doesn't matter how green they try to make it. 
I mean the World Bank is afraid to talk to people. Why 
are they afraid to talk to people? Their job is to 
improve the lives of people in the third world. Well 
then, what are they afraid of? Well, they're a 
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multilateral institution. They're made up of 
governments. Half of their members are governments 
that don't represent their people and therefore the World 
Bank as an institution can't go in and talk directly to the 
people. Well, if that's the case, then we're going to 
have to close the institution down, because if you're 
spending money that influences the way other people 
live, then you've got to be accountable to them. You've 
got to give those people the right to say no and if they 
don't have the right to say no, then mistakes are going 
to be made--a lot of mistakes with very, very large 
consequences. 
Lister Sinclair 
On Ideas tonight you've been listening to a conversation 
between Pat Adams, the executive director of Probe 
International, and David Cayley, part two of a four-part 
series called "Redefining Development." The series is 
written and presented by David Cayley. Technical 
production was by Mike Furness. Production assistants: 
Gail Brownell and Faye Macpherson. Archivist: Ken 
Puley. The executive producer of Ideas is Bernie Lucht. 
Lister Sinclair 
Good evening. I'm Lister Sinclair and this is Ideas. In 
1987 the U.N.'s Brundtland Commission put a new term 
into general circulation: "sustainable development." 
The concept instantly caught fire. Our prime minister 
committed his government to the idea, the Canadian 
International Development Agency made it their policy, 
so did the World Bank. The trouble was no one really 
knew what the term meant. The Brundtland Commission 
made a stab at a definition. They defined as sustainable 
"development which meets the needs of the present 
generation without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their needs." But this only 
transformed the vexing problem of how to define 
sustainability into the even more vexing problem of how 
to define needs. If the problem of what sustainable 
development is has a solution, it may rest on the work of 
economist Herman Daly. For twenty years, Daly has 
been grappling with both the theoretical and practical 
questions that arise in trying to define sustainability. 
What is the proper scale of economic activity for a given 
society? How can ecological limitations be incorporated 
into economic theory? How can societies gain the 
benefits of free markets without being destroyed by their 
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unwanted side effects? 4 
Herman Daly 
Let's build for economic society the largest feasible 
playpen in which you can leave the child, the person, to 
be free. I mean if we run around always trying to 
correct individual behaviour every time somebody does 
something a little wrong, we'll go nuts. So just build an 
area within which the market and people can be free, but 
set the boundaries so that we can't hurt ourselves by 
overstepping and destroying the ecological niche in 
which we live and on which we depend. So if we can 
set those boundaries, we can rely on the market within 
those boundaries. But the market itself can't set the 
boundaries for itself. It needs collective, social, 
community action and coherence to set those overriding 
limits. 
Lister Sinclair 
Tonight on Ideas in part three of our four-part series 
"Redefining Development," we present a conversation 
with Herman Daly. The series is written and presented 
by David Cayley. 
David Cayley 4 
"There's something fundamentally wrong," Herman 
Daly once said, "in treating the earth as a business in 
liquidation." And yet, this is precisely how modern 
society has viewed the earth, as something to be used 
up, rather than husbanded or sustained. Endless growth 
and ever-increasing consumption are fundamental 
postulates of our economic science. The limitations of 
this approach are now widely evident. Adam Smith's 
invisible hand has become an invisible foot, Daly has 
said, inexorably kicking nature and society to pieces. 
But conventional economic theories can't get to grips 
with the problem. For this reason, Daly believes, we 
need a new economics. He calls his preferred approach 
a steady-state economics and he brought out his first 
book about it in 1971. There he posed the fundamental 
questions which have dominated his work. If economic 
society is to stop growing, at what level should it 
maintain itself and how is this to be accomplished? Last 
year, Daly brought out an ambitious new book called 
For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy 
Toward Community, the Environment, and a Sustainable 
Future. The book was co-authored by theologian John 
Cobb. Daly and Cobb argue that we have now entered- 
the era of what they call "uneconomic growth," a gro 
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which impoverishes rather than enriches, where "The 
faster we run, the behinder we get," as Alice says in 
Through the Looking Glass. They called for new, more 
sensitive measures of economic welfare, for a new 
economic anthropology which replaces the isolated 
human atoms of classical theory with the model of what 
they call "persons in community" and for a new sense of 
the absolute natural limits of economic activity. For 
many years, Herman Daly was a teacher at Louisiana 
State University. Today he's a senior economist in the 
environment department of the World Bank in 
Washington. I visited him at his office at the bank 
earlier this year and we began our conversation by 
talking about his most important teacher, Nicholas 
Georgescu- Roegen, with whom he studied at Vanderbilt 
University. Roegen's great achievement was to conceive 
economics in terms of the second law of 
thermodynamics, the so-called entropy law, and to point 
out how, in the light of this theory, economic activity 
inevitably degrades the environment. 
Herman Daly 
He was really interested in tying economics to its 
iophysical foundations and in seeing the influence of the 
aws of thermodynamics, particularly the entropy law, 
on how that constrained limit influenced economic life. 
He developed something that you might well call 
"bioeconomics" or "physical economics," without 
throwing out the social science part. I mean he didn't 
try to reduce value to energy or entropy or any such 
thing. Value has psychic roots, but it also has physical 
roots. Whereas neo- classical theory investigates the 
psychic roots in great detail, it totally neglects the 
physical roots and he set about correcting that. You can 
only burn the same lump of coal one time and you can't 
recycle the ashes into coal again. Maybe you can use 
them for soap or something else, but it's in a long 
dissipative chain, so there's no perfect recycling. I 
mean there's no recycling of energy at all, or, if you do 
recycle energy, it always takes more energy to carry out 
the recycle than the amount recycled. And materials 
recycling is never a hundred per cent complete and it 
always takes extra energy. So while it may be a good 
idea, it's not a free lunch and it doesn't get you out of 
the ultimate dependence on this entropic flow of matter 
and energy from the environment through the economy 
'and then back to the environment as waste. 
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David Cayley 
So having Roegen as a teacher, you posed the problem 
of the steady state to yourself right from the start? 
Herman Daly 
Yes, I did. Now he's never liked that. He's always felt 
that that was a point at which his disciple had somewhat 
deserted him or not taken him seriously enough. In a 
sense, of course, he's right, that there is no such thing 
as a steady state in the very long run. The entropy law 
is true. It's eventually going to run down. Well, my 
attitude is that's right, I accept that, but I still think 
there's a big difference between fifty years and five 
hundred thousand years, even though maybe in five 
million years it's all over with. 
David Cayley 
Why was it that the biophysical constraints were left out 
of classical economics? 
Herman Daly 
I think the reason is that economic theory developed at 
a time when the human scale in the total biosphere was 
relatively small and so it made a certain amount of sense 
to think of sources of raw material and sinks for waste 
material as infinite, or not really scarce. So economics 
abstracts from whatever is not scarce. And now the 
scale of the human economy has grown to where it's no 
longer a negligible force in the biosphere, so we have to 
change that assumption. And I suppose the other thing 
is a kind of pre-analytic vision of the nature of the 
economic process as an isolated, circular flow, a 
commodities exchange from farms to households, and 
factors go from households to farms, and it just kind of 
goes around and around in a circle with no inputs from 
the outside, no outputs to the outside. So this vision 
which you find in the first pages of any standard 
textbook is that of an isolated system. An isolated 
system has no environment. It has no points of contact 
with the environment. So from the beginning you 
abstracted from these kinds of things and it's pretty hard 
to bring them back in after you've developed your whole 
theory on the basis of this abstraction. When the 
environment comes along and hits you in the face, you 
have to deal with it as an "externality," which is why 
you see that word everywhere in economic literature 
nowadays--externalities, externalities. These are things 
that didn't really fit in the theory but they're too 
important to ignore, so we have to deal with them 
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somehow. So you do it in a kind of ad hoc fashion as 
externalities. 
David Cayley 
Is it also a question of displacing problems onto nature 
to avoid human rivalry? 
Herman Daly 
Oh, yes. I think if you look at one of the main reasons 
for growth it's to have more for everyone, so you don't 
have to share, because sharing brings about conflict and 
people don't want to give up anything, so you can just 
increase the total amount. And that means encroach 
more on the natural world, take in more materials and 
energy to divide up among people, and so that the big 
thrust for growth, I think, is to avoid sharing or to put 
it off for as long as possible. 
David Cayley 
In their book For the Common Good, Herman Daly and 
John Cobb accuse conventional economic theory of what 
they call "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness." The 
phrase comes from John Cobb's mentor, Alfred North 
Whitehead. It means essentially forgetting that 
abstractions are abstractions and 'reading them back into 
reality as if they themselves were something real. Daly 
sees this mistake as endemic to the discipline of 
economics. 
Herman Daly 
Let's suppose that economic activity were making a 
pizza, then economic theory would sort of abstract from 
the pizza one or two characteristics, in this case by 
analogy it would probably abstract the circular shape of 
the pizza and then economic theory would consist of 
statements about how fast the radius has to grow in 
order for the area of the pizza to double in a certain 
time, and then it reasons in these categories. And then 
along comes someone and asks, "Hey, what about cheese 
and anchovies and how much pizza is really enough?" 
And these questions are not easily answered put in the 
context of the geometrical shape of a pizza and so ... 
David Cayley 
The anchovies are an externality. 
Herman Dav 
They're an externality or they're kind of left out. So if 
you then draw conclusions about real-world economic 
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pizza-making from this theory, which only looks at theAM 
circular shape of the pizza, then that's going to be 
fallacious. You're going to say, "Well, we can have so 
many pizzas this size," and it'll turn out there won't be 
enough anchovies or something. You will have 
abstracted from all of these other things, like anchovies 
and cheese, and reasoned only in terms of the circular 
shape of the pizza. That's the fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness. I mean you've left those things out of 
your basic abstractions and then you draw conclusions 
that have to do with those things and frequently they're 
wrong. 
David Cayley 
Does the fact that economics presumes first to be a 
social science and then to be an independent discipline 
also enter into this problem of abstraction? 
Herman Daly 
Oh yes. Abstraction is rampant, of course, in all 
disciplines. I think maybe it reaches toxic levels in 
economics. And of course I'm not knocking abstraction 
because that's necessary for thinking and indeed the 
identifier, the father let's say, or the person who spoke 
about the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, was Alfred 
North Whitehead, who was certainly no stranger to 
abstract thought. But precisely because he was so adept 
at abstract thought, he recognized its limitations as well 
as its powers and emphasized this. Now I think often in 
economics and in other disciplines we see really only the 
power of abstract thought, which is considerable, and 
tend to be a little bit blind to the limitations that it 
raises. By the nature of the case, if you've abstracted 
from certain things that are important, then they're going 
to come back and haunt you at a later stage of your 
thought and policy. 
David Cayley 
Before we come to those accumulating externalities, 
what are the other major assumptions of classical 
economics you'd want to identify here as now being 
problematic? 
Herman Daly 
I think there's the homo economicus as the pure 
individual whose identity is totally self-contained and so 
that all relations between individuals are purely external, 
that is, that the individual is defined independently of al 
his relationships with everyone else and all relations az 
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lkxternal. John Cobb and I have argued that a better 
model of a truer homo economicus is that people are 
persons in community, that is, their very self-identity is 
made up of the most important of these relationships, or 
relationships are internal to the very definition of the 
individual, and not just external things to the individual. 
And if you take that point of view, then community 
becomes important. Community is built into the 
definition of the individual and to what the individual 
wants and how he acts. In current economics, 
community is nothing other than the subtotal of 
individual relationships and all of these relationships are 
external, so community is just an aggregate of 
individuals. But we say community is much more than 
an aggregate of individuals. Community enters into the 
very definition of what the individual is, how he sees 
himself. If I am son of Mildred and Edward, father of 
Karen, husband to Marcia, you take all those things 
away from me, then there's not a whole lot left. There's 
something left, but it's not much. And so we say that 
all these relationships constitute the individual's identity. 
David Cayley 
Wou spoke earlier of the externalities that the theory 
doesn't take account of, which have to be added. And 
these accumulate. More and more are identified, which 
corresponds to Thomas Kuhn's theory of what happens 
to a scientific paradigm. More and more things are seen 
to be wrong with it. Do we need a new paradigm? 
Herman Daly 
I think so. And the externalities are almost perfectly 
analogous to Ptolemaic epicycles. You know, before 
Copernicus, and I guess Kepler, they always wanted to 
explain the motions of the heavenly bodies in terms of 
circles because obviously a circle is the perfect figure. 
I mean why would God do anything so weird as an 
ellipse? So you keep having circles and then circles 
piled on circles until you manage to trace out the actual 
pattern. And it worked, it was just terribly complicated. 
And then once the idea came, well, let's use an ellipse, 
then the whole thing was greatly simplified. So I think 
that's what we're doing with externalities. Externalities 
are epicycles. We just keep piling up more and more, 
and we need to recognize then that economic 
commodities don't just flow in nice little circles within 
economy, but they take broad elliptical orbits which Fthe 
o through the ecosystem and then back through the 
economy and affect many different things. 
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David Cayley 
So nature and community are in effect the ellipses of the 
new paradigm. 
Herman Daly 
Yes, you might say that. Nature and community as the 
foci of an ellipse that defines the ... 
David Cayley 
You also expressed in your book reservations, however, 
about the idea of a paradigm, reservations about a 
powerful, new explanatory framework. 
Herman Daly 
Well, we've expressed reservations about a deductive 
system, because economics has modelled itself after 
physics and it wants to be a deductive system. Just get 
a few first principles that are right and then by 
mathematics you can work out everything else. Yes, we 
have a lot of doubts about that. We think that we ought 
to be much more historical and recognize the changing 
circumstance of time and place and not try to be so-all- 
embracing in terms of economic theory. 
David Cayley 
Economics more as a sort of natural history of human 
activity? 
Herman Daly 
Yes, that's a good way to put it. It's more on the order 
of natural history, which has a few principles. It's not 
bereft of any unifying principles, but it tends to be rather 
historical in particular, rather than just deductive and 
totally general in its approach. And on the thing of 
paradigm, I've recently discovered that the great 
economist Joseph Schumpeter, long before Thomas 
Kuhn, had expressed the same idea using a different 
term. He spoke of a pre-analytic vision. He said before 
analysis can begin, you have to have a pre-analytic, 
cognitive act, which he called vision, which gives you 
the basic shape of the thing that you're going to analyze, 
and anything that's left out of your pre-analytic vision 
can't be corrected by later analysis. That's sort of 
related to that fallacy of misplaced concreteness once 
again. Once you've left it out, you're not going to get 
it in. So I felt that Schumpeter's way of looking at 
things was very much like Kuhn's and I even think that 
the term "pre-analytic vision" is more descriptive than' 




Herman Daly is seeking a new paradigm or pre-analytic 
vision for economics, but there's a great deal in 
economics that he wants to preserve. In terms of Ivan 
Illich's distinction between those seeking an alternative 
economics and those seeking an alternative to economics, 
Daly is definitely on the side of alternative economics. 
He doesn't challenge the basic postulate of scarcity, for 
example. His aim is not to redefine economic activity, 
but to establish it within its proper limits, to see, for 
example, what markets are good for and what they aren't 
good for. 
Herman Daly 
The thing that economics does rather well, or at least 
markets do rather well, is to allocate resources among 
alternative uses by using decentralized decision-making. 
Markets are a way of getting decisions way down to the 
local level of the individual user and avoiding huge 
bureaucracies and central planning and all of that. So I 
think that's what market economics does well. What it 
does poorly or what the market has no real capacity for 
sensing, I think, are really two things: one, which has 
long been recognized, is the distribution of income. 
Markets will distribute income in a way which may be 
efficient from an incentive point of view, but it can be 
highly unjust. So the problem of justice in distribution 
has long been recognized. The other, where I think the 
recognition is much more recent, is the question of the 
optimal or proper scale of the entire human economy 
relative to the ecosystem. The market has a tendency to 
grow and so reaches a point at which, as the economy 
continues to grow, the marginal, the extra costs of 
further growth are greater than the extra benefits. 
Beyond that point, further growth doesn't make you 
richer, it makes you poorer, because it increases costs 
faster than benefits. Now, we haven't recognized that 
yet in our public policy, and so forth. We generally 
say that growth is ... we just take it for granted that the 
benefits far outweigh the costs. I mean they did it in the 
past, so why won't they in the future? Well, they won't 
in the future because we're at a much larger scale now 
and we cause much greater impacts on the natural world, 
which produces much greater feedbacks from the natural 
world: ozone depletion, C02, greenhouse gases, acid 
rain. All these things are products of a large-scale 
intervention by human beings in the ecosystem and their 
costs are increasing faster at the margin than the 
benefits. To take an extreme example: If ozone 
IDEAS 
depletion results from CFC propellants getting into the 
atmosphere, what's the benefit of these propellants?, 
Well, instead of a finger pump on a can, you have a 
pressurized spray. Maybe it has some advantages in air 
conditioning. Okay, what are the costs? The costs may 
be increased incidents of skin cancer, disruption of 
agriculture worldwide. So at the margin then the costs 
seem to go up faster than the benefits in many 
dimensions of economic growth, and I think that we 
have to recognize the concept of an optimal scale of the 
entire human economy relative to the ecosystem, along 
with an optimal allocation of resources, and a just 
distribution of wealth. 
David Cayley 
Is it only because physical nature begins to kick back 
and there's a hole in the ozone layer or do you think that 
human nature also revolts against this scale of economic 
activity that we presently have? 
Herman Daly 
Yes. I think human nature also suffers under this. This 
is partly what John Cobb and I were trying to get at with 
the idea of community, that the most satisfying relations 
people have, they really, I think, stem from community 
and from some sense of belonging to a place and time 
and in a group with satisfying personal relationships, 
more than consumption of another tennis racquet or a 
golf club or something. So if in our striving for 
efficiency to produce more golf clubs, we end up 
destroying communities so that you can't find a golfing 
partner anymore, or that it's hard for you to make 
friends or talk to anyone, then we've given up more than 
we've gained, and I think this is what John Cobb and I 
were trying to get back into economics. 
David Cayley 
How to get from here to there is something you've been 
thinking about for many, many years. And in a number 
of books, like Steady-State Economics, you've made 
proposals. Can we talk about what your major proposals 
are, first of all, to find the optimum scale? How can 
one think of that? 
Herman Daly 
Of course one of our problems is that we don't measure 
the costs of growth. We just have the GNP, which is a 
mixture of costs and benefits insofar as they cause 
expenditures. We just throw them all together. So we, 
24 
IDEAS 
Phould separate out the cost component of GNP and the 
benefit component, keep separate accounts and 
occasionally compare them, instead of just adding them 
together. Now one thing John and I did in the book was 
an appendix. We developed an index of sustainable 
economic welfare and one way of interpreting that index 
is to say that what we found was that for the United 
States from 1970 to 1986, which was the last year of our 
series, extra costs of economic growth in the U.S. were 
sufficient to outweigh extra benefits, so that aggregate 
welfare was pretty much constant, declined even a little 
bit, according to what we consider to be a fairly 
reasonable measure. 
David Cayley 
Could you give an example of something that looked like 
a benefit when it was aggregated in GNP, which was 
actually a cost when you teased it out? 
Herman Daly 
Well, I think there are two major categories that I found. 
One is the liquidation of natural capital--the forests, 
mines. You cut down a forest beyond its natural 
k enerative capacity, then that's consumption of capital. e forest kept in its original state would yield a certain 
income, a certain sustainable yield of trees, year after 
year. But if you go and you just cut down the whole 
forest and in the year you cut it down you treat all that 
as income, that's not proper. That's capital 
consumption. That's like selling your house and 
spending all the money this year, thinking you were rich 
because you sold your house this year and you lived 
high on the hog, but then the next year you're poor. 
And similarly with mines. When you're depleting a 
mine, you count all the copper sold in the current year 
as pure income, a large part of that is capital. So, 
consuming capital. And the other thing is not 
subtracting what economists call regrettably necessary 
defensive expenditures, the expenditures that we have to 
make to protect ourselves from the side effects of other 
production, so that if a firm is polluting the air and 
causing medical upper-respiratory problems and you 
have to go to the doctor, then those medical expenditures 
are really the costs of producing whatever was being 
produced that caused you to get sick. 
David Cayley 
Do according to your calculations, the U.S. has already 
entered an era of diseconomic or uneconomic growth. 
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Herman Daly 
Yes, exactly. Uneconomic or I'd even say anti- 
economic growth in the sense that if we grow now, costs 
seem to be going up faster than benefits, so that makes 
us poor. And it's hard for people to become accustomed 
to that watershed because if you ... Frequently people 
say, "Oh, we have to grow more, we have to grow 
more, in order to be able to afford the costs of cleaning 
it up and of helping the poor." Well, nobody doubts 
that if you're truly richer than it's easier to do 
everything, including clean up the costs of growth, and 
help the poor. But the question at issue isn't that. The 
question is, "Does growth from the present margin really 
make you richer or is it not making you poor?" If it's 
making you poor, then we can't appeal to growth as a 
way to help clean up or pay extra expenses. It just 
makes things more difficult. 
David Cayley 
How long have we already been in this era of 
diseconomic growth by your reckoning? 
Herman Daly 
Well, you know, it's hard to say, but our rough 
calculations sort of show that, as I mentioned before, 
from 1970 to 1986, at least over that period, it looks like 
welfare in the U.S. has been pretty flat. Now, I should 
say that this depends on a whole lot of assumptions that 
one makes in measuring the index, one of which in our 
case was that we weighted extra income to poor people 
more heavily than extra income to rich people and 
there's very good reasons in economic theory for doing 
that. I mean there's the idea of diminishing marginal 
utility -- everyone satisfies their most pressing wants first 
-- and so a dollar income to a poor person means more 
food, clothing, shelter, basic needs. An extra dollar 
income to a rich person may mean a third TV set in a 
summer home or something, which doesn't really add to 
his well-being nearly as much as an extra amount of 
food adds to the well-being of a poor person. 
David Cayley 
To achieve a steady state -- I brought this up earlier and 
then got onto another subject -- you said first of all you 
would need the means of identifying what's going on in 
the economy and what are the benefits and what are the 





I think you really don't even need ... you need to know 
those measures of costs and benefits to choose an 
optimal level at which to maintain a steady state, but we 
could maintain a steady state at various levels and not 
the optimum one. But I think basically you need to limit 
two things: You need to limit human population growth 
and you need to limit the growth of per-capita human 
consumption. So if we put some limits on reproduction 
and some limits on our per-capita consumption, that's 
what I think is required. Now I think the easiest way to 
limit consumption, and I mean here consumption of 
resources, material, physical things, is to do it at the 
depletion end, at the input end, to restrict the amount 
that we extract from nature and bring into the economy. 
By restricting that, we will ultimately also limit the 
amount that exits as waste later on. So something on the 
order of a depletion quota or a severance tax. As time 
goes on I tend to make more and more modest proposals 
as my more radical ones are ignored. So now I'm sort 
of, for the United States at least, I'm saying, "Here's a 
proposal which wouldn't get us all the way to a steady 
state but I think it would be a nice step forward for the 
U.S. to put a heavy severance tax on resources, 
particularly energy." Raise most of our public revenue 
from a heavy tax on resources. Then ease up on the 
income tax, particularly the taxation of lower incomes 
and perhaps even have a negative income tax at the very 
low levels of income, again financed by receipts from 
the severance tax. This would do several things. It 
would limit the material inflow of resources out of 
nature into the economy. We've now made that 
expensive. Also, it would incentivate the technologies 
which would use these resources much more efficiently 
and productively because they're more expensive, so 
we're going to economize more on them. Just like we 
did when the Arabs raised the price of oil, we learned to 
be much more efficient with oil, but instead 'of paying 
the Arabs the extra money, why don't we pay it into the 
U.S. treasury and ease up on income taxes and let the 
poor have some benefit as a result? And I think also a 
severance tax is easier to administer and collect than an 
income tax. It's harder to avoid it and it has less of an 
effect on incentives to work. So here would be 
something that we could do which would increase the 
efficiency of resource use. The technical optimists tell 
us that we can increase efficiency by factors of ten or 
twenty. Okay, if that's right, then let's do it. Here's a 
way to push. Pessimists say, "Well, we probably can't 
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do that but we really need to limit the resourc 
throughput." Well, this limits the resource throughput 
so both optimists and pessimists ought to be happy with 
such a proposal. Well, that's a kind of one step towards 
a steady-state system. 
David Cayley 
Don't you run into the problem if you're making the 
proposal for the United States of the interdependence of 
the United States? I mean, American producers 
competing with producers in other countries which 
haven't done this? 
Herman Daly 
Well, you're absolutely right. This is a really big 
problem and one that I think is just ... You in Canada 
have already had a debate on free trade and things like 
that, but in this country it hasn't been debated and the 
big problem, the big conflict, is just as you've outlined. 
All economists will agree that the way to deal with 
environmental problems is to internalize the 
environmental, costs into prices. If a country does that, 
then its prices go up. If its prices go up, it will be at a 
trading disadvantage relative to countries who have not 
internalized those prices. So I think the internal polici 
of sustainable development or steady state is going to 
require some kind of an external protection. You'll 
probably have to have tariffs to protect producers against 
countries who do not internalize those costs. Maybe 
when a whole bunch of countries adopt the same national 
rules of cost internalization, then you might have free 
trade among people who play by the same rules, but 
certainly you can't have some countries internalizing 
costs while others don't and then have them trade freely 
with each other. 
David Cayley 
So in other words, regionalization of economies, if not 
nationalization, making them more self-sufficient units, 




Unless you could devise a way for everyone in the world 





Yes, that sounds kind of hard to do. So you're better 
off to have a greater degree of self-sufficiency. We 
argue for this in the book. We go back to John 
Meynard Keynes. It comes as a surprise to many people 
to find that he argued very forcefully for national self- 
sufficiency, not in the extreme autarchic sense, but just 
in the sense ... I think he said something to the effect 
that ideas, art, hospitality, travel - these are the things 
that are international -- but let goods be homespun as 
much as possible and also finance be primarily national. 
So we call that short-supply lines. Try to keep your 
supply lines short. We don't try to make a fetish out of 
being totally self-sufficient in any arbitrarily defined 
area, but just other things being equal, keep those supply 
lines short. 
David Cayley 
It certainly doesn't seem to be the way things are going 
at the moment. 
Herman Daly 
No, really it doesn't. I think there's a tendency to 
ejoice in the maximum possible interdependence and 
Rengthening of supply lines. People seem to think that 
this ties the world together into one complex, 
interdependent unit, and that, therefore, people will all 
learn how to get along with each other because the cost 
of not doing so would be too great. I just don't think 
history bears that out very much. I think it just means 
that when we screw up, the costs of mistakes in one area 
are going to be spread all over. 
David Cayley 
This may come from an earlier period when you were 
making more radical proposals that no one listened to, 
but in your first version of The Steady State, I believe 
you also proposed maximum and minimum incomes to 
limit consumption. 
Herman Daly 
Yes. That was the notion and I still like this proposal. 
We didn't really make it in the new book but we came 
pretty close. The approach we take is limits to 
inequality. The idea is not to push towards equality 
because there are many good reasons for having different 
comes, but unlimited inequality is a violation of 
If mmunity. If one person owns everything and 
everybody else owns nothing, then surely you can't talk 
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about community. So there has to be some sort of 
limited inequality that goes along with community. Now 
if you go all the way to pure, to absolute equality, that's 
a denial of individual differences in community, which 
we think should be respected. So there's some limited 
band of inequality. What should that range be? Well, 
that's an empirical question. We can experiment. My 
own view is, I think, a factor of ten difference between 
the highest and lowest is enough to reward all important 
differences and still create a sense of community in 
which people respect the differences and need for 
rewarding greater efforts. Just look at a university or 
look at the military or look at civil service, you find 
generally a factor of ten difference. I don't see any 
reason why it needs to be much greater than that. I 
mean, nowadays what do we have? It must be a factor 
of a hundred or more. 
David Cayley 
In other words, where people have had to come to grips 
with this in a bureaucracy, they've already arrived 
roughly at this factor of ten difference. 
Herman Daly 
Yes. People ask, what happens when people would 
reach the maximum limit? We'd say, "Well, their 
incentive is gone, they won't produce anymore." Well, 
the opportunities that they would have exploited are still 
around for other people to exploit.. Once they've hit the 
limit, that doesn't mean ... I mean, what can they do 
then? If they really enjoy what they're doing, they keep 
on doing it just for the fun of it. If they don't enjoy 
what they're doing, well then, hurray. Here's an 
opportunity to go do'... I could be a gardener now. 
I've hit my limit -- I can go write a book or I can be a 
gardener or I can try to be a professional tennis-player 
and I won't starve because I get beat all the time or 
whatever. 
David Cayley 
The third aspect was limiting births. Incomes, births, 
depletion of resources. This is probably the hardest one. 
It's certainly the most difficult for me to contemplate. 
Can you say, first of all, what your initial proposal on 
this was and then what changes you've gone through in 
relation to it? 
Herman Daly 
The original proposal was something that actually 
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Kenneth Boulding had first suggested, an orphan 
brainchild of his that I adopted. 
David Cayley 
You mean he'd already been driven out of town over it. 
Herman Daly 
Yeah. I love Kenneth Boulding. He's one of the people 
I've learned most from, but you know he first proposed 
it by saying, "In all seriousness, I believe that," and then 
later on he referred to it as, "A few years ago I 
somewhat jokingly suggested that..." But the idea was, 
if you can see that reproduction has to be limited, then 
let's create a new right to reproduce, a legal right to 
reproduce, and let's distribute that right equally, on the 
basis of total equality. One person, one right, or each 
woman two rights, or various ways you could do it. 
And then not everybody wants to reproduce, not 
everybody can reproduce. Those who don't then could 
give, trade, sell their right to somebody who wants more 
than two children and can afford to buy it or can finagle 
you into giving it to them. Many people react with 
horror to that and they say, "Oh, the rich will have an 
advantage. The rich will have 'an advantage." Yes, 
that's true. The rich always have an advantage; that's 
the whole point of being rich. The rich buy Cadillacs 
and the poor can't; the rich get access to blood when 
they need it for operations, the poor don't. This is true; 
and if we don't want that to happen, then the way to do 
that is to limit the total advantages of the rich by the 
other institution, which is the limits to inequality -- the 
minimum and the maximum. We say, "We're going to 
take care of that with a minimum income so that people 
will not be disadvantaged beyond some point." Also, I 
think that this is not buying and selling children. This 
is a legal right to reproduce. If more children are born 
to richer rather than poorer parents, then there's 
something to be said for that. That's a benefit to the 
children. It tends to equalize the per-capita distribution 
of income if that happens. Now the problems come, of 
course, in enforcement. What sort of ways would you 
have for enforcement? Well, any sort of population- 
control scheme is going to face the problem of 
enforcement and I don't know really what are the best 
ways. You want ways which do not penalize the 
innocent child. Unfortunately, the Chinese program, 
some of their means of enforcement fall rather heavily 
on the children and indeed the whole family. Food 
rations are not increased, or are limited, and so on. So 
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I'm not sure what would be the best forms ofA 
enforcement or punishment. I'd just say one thing,10 
people look upon this as a restriction of freedom. Sure 
it is. But if you go back and you read the classic 
defense of freedom, John Stuart Mill's On Liberty, you 
find that he makes a specific case for the right of the 
state to see to it that a country is not overpopulated by 
laws which delay marriage until a couple is able to 
support children, or by various things like this. So 
there's a long and solid tradition of arguing that there is 
a collective interest in limiting a nation's population. 
Now in the nineteenth century it was commonly the 
practice not to do this, but on the other hand, you see, 
there was no welfare state. So the rule then was to let 
the unfortunate offspring starve and so that was a pretty 
effective way of dealing with overpopulation. It was a 
very cruel way and I don't think very many people 
advocate that today. But if we want to move away from 
that, if we want to adopt a rule that unfortunate offspring 
are not going to be allowed to starve, they're going to be 
taken care of by the society, then we have a correlative 
obligation to see to it that there are not so many 
unfortunate offspring that we can't deliver on that 
obligation. So this is a big problem and I think we still 
need to keep plugging away at it. 
David Cayley 
Well, I can't see that there isn't a problem. Obviously 
your proposals are unpalatable, everybody else's 
proposals are unpalatable. What's happened in China, 
for example, seems pretty grim. And yet, it's hard to 
say, "Well, just let it go. Population is self-limiting at 
some level." 
Herman Daly 
Yes, it certainly is self-limiting. It's self-limiting in 
Malthusian terms, you know, what Malthus called the 
positive checks of misery, starvation and vice, where he 
considered birth control to be vice. The neo- 
Malthusians said, "No, birth control is not vice; birth 
control is prudence." So I'm very much a neo- 
Malthusian in that sense. I think we can exercise some 
foresight and social planning on the issue of birth 
control. Now the Chinese, I think they deserve a prize 
in gratitude from all mankind for having been the first 
society that really seriously tried to deal with the 
problem. They were driven to it. For many years they 
kept saying, you know, the old Marxist line that we hav 
to protect the people from capitalism, not capitalisA 
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11rom the people, the more people the better, and so on. 
Well, they've backed off from that. Now, the other 
problem there is not just a matter of population, it's also 
a matter of per-capita consumption. What's really 
limited is the aggregate throughput from nature, the total 
flow from nature through the economy, back to nature, 
at some sustainable level. That's equal to population 
times per-capita resource consumption. We can operate 
on either of those variables. In rich countries we could 
say, "Oh, it's good to have a lot of people, let's just 
lower per-capita consumption. We don't need all this 
stuff, let's have more people." We could do that. In 
poor countries that's a lot more difficult to do because 
they're much closer to the minimum necessary, so their 
only alternative is to work on the people factor of the 
equation and not the per-capita consumption side. 
David Cayley 
What is the point, do you think, of making proposals as 
radical as yours in the present circumstances, where 
obviously they're not going to be immediately adopted 
by anyone? 
erman Daly 
o, they won't be immediately adopted, but I guess the 
reason is that we think that the present circumstances 
won't be maintained. Things are going to get a lot 
worse and then these costs of growth will become so 
prevalent that everyone can see them. And already 
people are far ahead of the politicians. I think people 
are much more willing to accept leadership and 
recognition of these constraints than the politicians are. 
So at some point, you know, after there's been a big 
disaster for environmental reasons, then we get serious 
and want to reconstruct and do things differently. Well, 
at least then there will be something on the table to start 
with and the discussion won't have to start from scratch. 
In a sense, neither John nor I, I think, would be very 
comfortable if we were suddenly made dictators and told 
to put everything into practice. We feel that we ought 
to have to go through the gauntlet of convincing people 
because that's a kind of verification, because we're like 
other people and these same arguments that convinced us 
ought to convince other reasonable people. If they 
don't, then maybe there's something wrong with our 
argument. So we have a certain amount of faith that 
reason and argument and persuasion are effective and 
Will prevail. To the extent that they're not workable, 
we're quite willing to re-examine our own views. 
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Maybe we're wrong. 
David Cayley 
Do you fear that as the era of diseconomic growth 
continues, this actually has a disintegrating effect on 
society, that a moral disintegration is actually taking 
place, so that you're losing precisely what you need to 
reconstruct the world along the lines you've envisioned? 
Herman Daly 
That is exactly, I think, the biggest danger. What we 
need is to build on the remnants of community that exist 
in order to enact these limits; and if the very system 
which denies limits is destroying the community, which 
is necessary to impose the limits, then we're in a real 
bind. That's a real impasse. So our hope is that there's 
still enough community left where we can begin to build 
on that, consolidate and build on it, before we tear 
things up too much. You've really, I think, put your 
finger on what is a real danger, that the corrosive effect 
on community is doubly bad because. it's precisely 
community that you need in order to limit this increasing 
corrosive effect. 
David Cayley 
At the end of the sixties and the beginning of the 
seventies, there were a number of books that, I think, 
created a mood that you might call ecological pessimism, 
not optimistic about the human prospect. One of the 
essays that you anthologized, I think, in one of your 
earlier volumes was William Ophul's, "Leviathan or 
Oblivion?", which puts it pretty starkly. Now at that 
time I think you were not exactly participating in that 
mood. You were more concerned to make proposals. 
It's almost twenty years later. I wonder what your 
mood is today? 
Herman Daly 
That's an interesting question. All during the years in 
which I was teaching a lot of this stuff, more than once 
I had students come to me and say, "Oh, Professor 
Daly, this is all so pessimistic. I'm going to drop your 
course. I mean, it's just ruining my life, you know, too 
many things to worry about. " And I had to take that 
seriously because these were youngsters and many of 
them are really not well-equipped to deal with really 
pessimistic, serious things. I'd like to make a distinction 
between pessimism and optimism on the one hand and 
hope and despair on the other, so that I would say 
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whether you're a pessimist or an optimist, that's a kind 
of a betting man's rational expectation about the way 
things are likely to turn out. In that sense, I have to say 
I'm a pessimist. On the other hand, hope and despair 
are existential attitudes that you just impose on the world 
from your own being or you just say, "In spite of the 
fact that I am pessimistic, I will be hopeful because it is 
a sin to despair and hope is the proper attitude, so I will 
be hopeful, and I hope that my calculations are wrong. 
I hope I lose the bet. And I will set about doing things 
to try to see to it that I do lose that bet." So that's a 
kind of a way of squaring that circle or at least living 
with both things. 
David Cayley 
Herman Daly, thank you. 
Herman Daly 
Well, thank you very much. 
David Cayley 
One of Herman Daly'.s signal contributions to his field 
has been the identification of scale as a critical problem 
in economics. Until recently, the answer to the 
question, "How big should an economy be?" has always 
been, "As big as possible." Daly points to the 
possibility of identifying a natural scale for a given 
economic activity. In this sense, he belongs to a 
contemporary tradition which goes back to E.F. 
Schumacher's Small Is Beautiful and before that to the 
work of Schumacher's teacher, Leopold Kohr. Next 
week, in the final program of this series, I'll visit the 
Schumacher Society in western Massachusets and ask 
what this tradition has to contribute to redefining 
development. 
Lister Sinclair 
On Ideas tonight, you've been listening to the third 
program in our four-part series on redefining 
development. The series is written and presented by 
David Cayley. Production assistants: Gail Brownell and 
Faye Macpherson; technical production by Lome Tulk. 
The executive producer of Ideas is Bernie Lucht. 
Lister Sinclair 
Good evening. I'm Lister Sinclair and this is Ideas on 
redefining development. 
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E. F. Schumacher 
Growth is perhaps the second greatest mystery. Thil 
greatest mystery is the mystery of the cessation of 
growth. You know, that a thing can grow at all is 
wonderful, but that it knows when to stop, that is even 
more wonderful. 
Lister Sinclair 
Dr. E.F. Schumacher speaking on Ideas in 1975. Two 
years before, he had published Small Is Beautiful, the 
book that made his name and put his philosophy before 
a wide public. In his book, Schumacher argued that 
scale is a critical consideration in development, that all 
tools and institutions have their appropriate scale and 
turn destructive when they exceed it. What the world 
needed, he claimed, were the simple, non-violent 
technologies, which he called "intermediate 
technologies," technologies that could fit into their social 
circumstances without destroying them. Today the 
legacy of E.F. Schumacher is expressed in the work of 
the American Schumacher Society. Located in the 
Berkshires of western Massachusetts, the society has 
tried to devise the economic institutions that would allow 
Schumacher's dream of a renaissance at a small scale to, 
be realized -- institutions like community land trusts. 
Robert Swann 
The basic idea behind a land trust is to return to the 
community the value which is created by the community. 
Land appreciates in value generally not because of what 
individuals do for the land. They may improve it some, 
surely. You know, they may improve the soil, they may 
add buildings and so on, and those are definite 
improvements. But the land itself, the basic land, 
appreciates in value not because of what they do, but 
because the community itself becomes a valuable place 
to live, because of other people that are there. So the 
land trust idea is to return to the community the value 
which is created by the community. 
Lister Sinclair 
Tonight on Ideas we profile the work of the Schumacher 
Society in the fourth and final program of our series on 
redefining development. The series is written and 
presented by David Cayley. 
David Cayley 
In 1939, a young Austrian refugee called Leopold Kohr 
addressed an audience at the University of Toronto oA 
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'the subject of social size. He argued against a popular 
book of the time, called Union Now, which proposed 
that a lasting peace could only come about through 
political unification. Kohr claimed that the salvation of 
the world lay not in uniting the nations, but in 
dismembering them. The chief evil of the age, for 
Kohr, was paralyzing bigness, a cancerous overgrowth 
which dwarfed the human scale, drowned the individual 
voice, and annihilated local character. More than thirty 
years before The Club of Rome, he entitled one of his 
early articles "The Limits to Growth." Later he 
summarized his approach in a book called The 
Breakdown of Nations. Leopold Kohr was the first 
contemporary thinker to recognize the close link between 
form and size. The biologist J.B.S. Haldane, in a 
wonderful essay called "On Being the Right Size," had 
drawn attention to the narrow range of sizes within 
which a given form can exist. A horse can only be a 
horse at a certain scale. Kohr applied the same 
argument to society. Beyond a certain size, he argued, 
societies will atomize and disintegrate. Only in small, 
bounded, and peculiar places can we really be human. 
Kohr's ideas made a deep impression on E.F. 
1chumacher when Schumacher encountered them in the 
1960s and through Schumacher's Small-Is Beautiful they 
eventually gained a much wider audience. Today there 
are Schumacher societies in both Britain and the United 
States, which continue to develop these ideas. In 
tonight's program, you'll meet Susan Witt and Robert 
Swann of the American society. Bob Swann has devoted 
his life to the same quest for an ethical economics which 
animated Schumacher's last years. It began, he told me, 
during World War II. 
Robert Swann 
I became a conscientious objector at a time when that 
wasn't so easy to do. World War II was a very popular 
war and for good reasons with someone like Hitler, and 
yet I found myself unable to go along and shoot and kill 
people. I just could not do that. So the result of it was 
that I spent quite some time in jail. Jail is a great place 
to get an education if you really take advantage of it and 
we had some good opportunities there because we had a 
lot of men like myself that were also conscientious 
objectors, with a lot of background and interest and 
ideas of their own. So we had some excellent 
discussions, seminars, and so on, and prison became a 
Wind of a post-graduate course for me. And particularly, 
what was going on in the world with people like Gandhi 
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in India, I became very interested in Gandhian ideas. So 
that was a major influence in my life and I think that 
ever since that I've been committed in a certain direction 
that hasn't changed at all really. 
David Cayley 
One of the thinkers by whom Swann was most impressed 
was an American original called Ralph Borsodi. He 
became Swann's teacher and later his friend and 
collaborator. 
Robert Swann 
I would say Borsodi was the first American decentralist 
of a very significant kind. He was an economist by 
background and training, though he was pretty much 
self-taught. Never went to college. I don't even think 
he went to high school; he was an entirely self-taught 
man. But he became a very influential adviser in Wall 
Street. He advised some of the largest corporations on 
Wall Street in the twenties -- this is going back to the 
early 1920s -- until he became totally disillusioned with 
the whole Wall Street picture, because he was basically 
a philosopher and realized that the values and so on were 
not the values that he wanted to promote. And so he set 
up a small homestead in Long Island. He and his wife 
just bought a couple of acres of land and he began to 
experiment with how you could live as self-sufficiently 
as possible, with his wife baking bread, for example, 
and having a small garden to furnish all their own food, 
and so on. He wasn't aiming at total self-sufficiency, 
but he wanted to see how far you could go and what the 
efficiency was relative to the mass production of the 
going concerns. And so he spent a lot of his time 
developing these kinds of small-scale gadgets that might 
be workable, for instance, inventing a small machine that 
would grind wheat in the house, so you didn't have to 
go and buy the flour. You could buy the wheat and 
grind it yourself and make the bread, you know, this 
kind of simple machinery and equipment that later on 
Schumacher picked up and began to call "appropriate 
technology" or "intermediate technology," small-scale 
technology that could be worked at the home or nearby. 
That's the same kind of thing. So Borsodi was an early 
inventor and an early promoter and philosopher of the 
idea of decentralization. 
David Cayley 
Behind Borsodi stands the figure of Henry George, a 
nineteenth century American journalist and economist. 
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His book Progress and Poverty sold millions of copies - 
- perhaps the Small Is Beautiful of its day -- and attained 
a wide influence. George was a friend of Borsodi's 
father and Borsodi imbibed from him an idea which 
remains central to the Schumacher Society today. 
Robert Swann 
George put forth the idea that land should be taxed but 
not the improvements on it, to make it clear that it's the 
land where the real value is created by the community. 
The community creates that value, not the individual. 
The community deserves the appreciated value in land, 
not the individual. So therefore a tax should be put on 
land and not on the improvements. You don't want to 
penalize people for improving building houses and 
improving their life, but the land is something different. 
David Cayley 
Land was also a central preoccupation within the 
Gandhian movement in India, another contributor to the 
thought and practice of the Schumacher Society. 
Schumacher spent time in India with Gandhi's 
successors. So did Borsodi. And it was in the light of 
the Gandhian movement's experience that Borsodi began 
to imagine the institution that Bob Swann would 
eventually name "a community land trust." 
Robert Swann 
After Gandhi's death in 1947 -- this is something a lot of 
people don't understand - a man by the name of Vinoba 
Bhave became the recognized leader of the Gandhian 
movement. Gandhi had said himself that he thought that 
Bhave would be the leader after his death. And Bhave 
took on the problem in India of the landless, the problem 
of many, many millions of people in India who live in 
the villages but who own no land, who have no access 
to land and are at the mercy of the landowners and so 
on. So he began a pilgrimage, walking from village to 
village and talking to the people in the village. Because 
he was so recognized as a saint in India, it was easy. 
All the villagers would gather around. And he would 
say, "My brother here has no land, but you may have 
some land. You other people may have some land that 
you don't need so badly. Could you give my brother 
some land?" And many people would stand up and say 
"yes," amazingly. I mean it was unheard of that 
anybody would give up land in India, because land was 
the next thing to gold in terms of value. But over time, 
walking from village to village over a period of several 
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years, Vinoba actually accumulated several million acre 
of land. But then what happened was that the peoplg 
who were assigned to this land, this land that was given, 
found out that the land was valuable but they had 
nothing to work the land with. They didn't have a 
plough or oxen or anything, you know, just minimal 
things, minimal tools. And so some of them then, 
because they had the title to the land, the ownership 
now, turned around and sold the land because it gave a 
cash return, which they then took with them to Calcutta 
or somewhere, and then gradually became beggars on 
the street after the money ran out. So Vinoba realized 
that there had to be a different way and that's what was 
incorporated in what was the gramdan approach in India, 
which means "village gift of land." In the gramdan 
program, instead of the individual being given a piece of 
land as previously under what had been called the 
boodan land-gift approach, under the village gift 
approach the village was given the land and the elders of 
the community that already exist as a council, sort of, in 
India, were given the oversight of the land and they 
would give the right of use to individual landless farmers 
and they would try to help them to get that equipment 
and so on that they needed. But the farmers didn't have 
the ownership of the land. That was the difference' 
The ownership resided with the community and they had 
the right of use, so it was like a community land trust. 
It was the same form, in effect, as a community land 
trust. 
David Cayley 
The community land trust is an institution which builds 
on the heritage of both Henry George and the gramdan 
movement. The term itself was coined by Bob Swann 
when he and Borsodi began a sort of American gramdan 
movement in the sixties. A community land trust vests 
ultimate ownership of land in the community, while 
extending to those who live on the land most of the 
traditional prerogatives of owners, like long-term 
security of tenure, the right to make and benefit from 
improvements, and so on. Following George's 
distinction between the value a community gives its land 
by being a community and the value an individual gives 
it by his labour, the community land trust creates a sort 
of socialist-capitalist hybrid in which the just claims of 
the individual and the just claims of the community are 
harmonized. The first American land trust was created 
near Albany, Georgia, in the late sixties. The civil 
rights movement by then had accomplished its legislative 
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Dims, but rural blacks remained poor and landless. This 
was the issue Borsodi and Swann tackled in collaboration 
with Slater King, a cousin of Martin Luther King's. 
Robert Swann 
Slater had been well recognized as one of the strong 
leaders in the civil-rights movement, but he was also a 
businessman. He was actually in real estate, that was his 
business. So he was in a position to know about land 
and where land could be found and so on and shortly 
after we began this process, he was able to locate a tract 
of land, a 5,000-acre former plantation not far from 
Albany that could become and did become eventually the 
first community land trust in the United States. It was 
an expensive piece of land. It was over a million dollars 
to buy the land. Five thousand acres is a lot of land and 
it was a cliffhanger at the very end because the last fifty 
thousand that we needed to make it possible didn't come 
in till two minutes after the deadline -- not before, but 
after the deadline - and it was an interesting scene. I 
can describe it a little bit. The lawyers for the owners 
of the land - who didn't want to sell the land at that 
point because they saw that this was going to go into 
Tack hands and they were white and they hadn't realized 
t up until very recently - were hoping that we wouldn't 
be able to get all the money. And so there was a fifty- 
thousand-dollar cheque that was due through a bank, that 
was due to come in and it didn't come before the 
deadline. So the lawyer stood up and said, "I'm sorry, 
we're leaving. Too bad, but you didn't make it." The 
lawyer that represented our side, who happened to be the 
brother of Slater King, said, "I want to talk with you," 
(the lawyer). They had a little huddle in the corner and 
when they were through the huddle, their lawyer said, 
"We'll give you twenty minutes more." At that moment 
the man from the bank walked in the door with a fifty- 
thousand-dollar cheque in his hand. So everybody said, 
"What did you say? What did you say to the lawyer?" 
And, I'm sorry I can't remember his first name, but Mr. 
King, the lawyer, said, "Well, I happened to know 
something about some things that he's involved in and he 
had a conflict of interest in this and I threatened to take 
him into court if he didn't give us some more time." 
So, that's the way we finally got the land. It was a 
cliffhanger. It really was a cliffhanger. But that was the 
beginning and from there on it's been a development 
rocess. The institute that we started, which eventually 
ecame the Institute for Community Economics, then 
took on the role, I should say, of technical assistance to 
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groups. We wrote a book, the first book on community 
land trusts, back in 1972 and that began to promote the 
idea around the country. So we provided technical 
assistance to many, many various groups starting 
community land trusts. Today there are about sixty-five 
community land trusts in the country and many others 
that are forming or don't call themselves community 
land trusts but are essentially the same thing. 
David Cayley 
Did a farming community establish itself on that land in 
Georgia? 
Robert Swann 
Yes it did. 
David Cayley 
And is it still there? 
Robert Swann 
It's still there. Yes, it's still going. I haven't been in 
touch with them in the last few years, but they are still 
going as I understand it, very well. 
David Cayley 
At the same time that Bob Swann and Ralph Borsodi 
were building the Institute for Community Economics, 
a new magazine appeared in England called Resurgence. 
It presented the writings of Leopold Kohr and E.F. 
Schumacher. Schumacher in the fifties had been a 
relatively orthodox, Keynesian economist, but his faith 
in conventional development economics had been badly 
shaken by a trip to Burma. 
Robert Swann 
He said that when he was invited to go to Burma he 
thought he'd better do some homework and find out 
what the income and so on was in Burma and he 
discovered that it was sixty dollars a year. He said, "I 
thought, `My God, this will be the most poverty-stricken 
place I can imagine. It must be a terrible place to be."' 
So he went to Burma and, when he got there, he was 
amazed because he found that people were very happy. 
"Happier than they were in England," he said. And he 
said, "I was really baffled what was going on here," and 
it gradually began to eat at him, you know. And he 
realized that the ideas that he was about to give to the 
Burmese at that time of the conventional wisdom. of 
development just weren't appropriate. They wouldn't 
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work. So he began to revise his whole thinking. 
David Cayley 
Schumacher's reflections on his Asian experiences 
eventually informed one of his most beautiful and best- 
known essays, called "Buddhist Economics." This was 
one of the essays from Resurgence eventually collected 
in Small Is Beautiful. The book was published by 
Harper & Row in the early seventies, but gave no signs 
at first of its eventual popularity. 
Robert Swann 
It wasn't selling. I mean typically book publishing 
companies don't put a lot of money into a book until 
they think it's going to really go. So I wrote to Fritz 
and said, "Why don't you come over and we'll put you 
on a lecture tour and we'll promote the book and get the 
thing going." So that's what happened in 1974. He 
came over for his first trip to this country, where he 
would lecture. And we had some wonderful help from 
a lot of people, like Hazel Henderson, and so on, to help 
get his story into those places where it could really make 
some impact, like getting him on many of the radio 
programs and lots of other projects. So that began to 
promote the book and the book began to sell and became 
eventually the best non-fiction seller that Harper's have 
ever published. 
David Cayley 
Schumacher became known principally as an exponent of 
what he called "intermediate technology" -- affordable, 
appropriate, non-violent tools, which would enlarge a 
society's possibilities without undermining its social 
relations. Bob Swann's interests are complementary, but 
slightly different. He's interested less in the technology 
as such, than in creating the kinds of economic 
institutions within which such a new technology would 
make sense. When he undertook the presidency of the 
Schumacher Society, he undertook to create these new 
institutions, like land trusts. 
Robert Swann 
The community land trust is a non-profit corporation 
which owns the land, holds the land, without any 
possibility of any individual benefitting from that 
corporation, and it leases the land out to the individual 
families or individual persons, according to the use-value 
of that land. Now when I say use-value, I mean there's 
a difference between, say, housing as a use and farming 
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as a use. If you're a farmer, you obviously can't pay as 
much for land as you can if you are a builder of house 
or a seller of houses or whatever. You obviously can't. 
For instance, in this area here that we live in, if you 
want to build a house here, you will pay thirty thousand 
dollars or more per acre for a building lot, for a place 
that's suitable for a building. But if you're a farmer, if 
you pay more than five hundred dollars an acre for 
farming, you would probably go broke, because you 
can't afford it. You just can't afford it. So there's a 
vast difference in the value of land for one use as against 
another use, with commercial land being always the 
highest value, or being in an urban area always the 
highest value. So the community land trust is an effort 
to capture that value that's created by the community and 
bring it back to the community, rather than the 
individual reaping the value of that. 
David Cayley 
Land trusts are only one of the institutions which Swann 
believes will be necessary to support just and prosperous 
local economies. The society has also established a 
credit fund, which makes low-interest loans available in 
the region and built affordable housing. The next phase, 
according to Bob Swann's colleague Susan Witt, i4 
thinking about a regional currency, thinking which has 
been stimulated and encouraged by the pioneering work 
of Toronto's Jane Jacobs. 
Susan Witt 
She was the speaker for us at the Schumacher Society 
lectures and did a wonderful talk about regional planning 
and regional growth and developing fully each region, 
rather than creating these "elephantine cities," as she 
calls them. She would rather see each region develop 
fully and in a variety of ways on its own, and has done 
a lot of thinking about how this can happen. Her book 
Cities and the Wealth of Nations addresses this issue. 
She gave her talk just before her book came out, so we 
didn't have the advantage of reading her book before the 
talk. In the question-and-answer period, she said, "Of 
course, I don't think any of this can happen without the 
development of regional currencies." Well, I did think 
I'd have to pick Bob Swann off the floor and afterwards 
he said, "Jane, how did you come up with this?" And 
she said, "Well, it's just reasonable and rational," and 
she said, "When I first realized the necessity for it, I 
was a bit frightened, because I didn't see how it could be 
done. I didn't understand how it could be done." Anc 
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03ob said, "Well, let us tell you about our Berkshare 
program that we've been thinking about." So that 
started a mutual collaboration and interest and love affair 
between the Schumacher Society and Jane. 
Robert Swann 
Regions have different needs for money that are not 
taken into consideration by our centralized system of 
banking that we have today. A centralized system takes 
a look at the nation as a whole and says, "Ah, well, we 
better issue more money." That is, we better, through 
the federal reserve system or whatever the system is, 
put some more money out because it looks like the 
economy needs more money. It's going down a little 
bit. We'd better feed it some more money. But it may 
not be true that the economy of this particular region 
needs more money. It might not need more money at 
all, whereas over here there may be a great need for 
money. So, as Jane Jacobs is pointing out, there's no 
way of controlling where that money goes from the 
national level. It-just goes out into the economy as a 
whole and it does not work within the necessities of the 
region. So what we want to do is create regional I urrencies that only work within those regions, so the 
currency can be expanded or contracted according to the 
needs of the region. And to do that, we've begun some 
experiments, and that's all I can call them right now is 
experiments. The first one we've initiated is having a 
couple of local farmers who have farm stands, where 
they sell their own produce, sell at this point what 
amounts to a gift certificate or a certificate of 
indebtedness, which they sell for nine dollars, a 
certificate which will buy ten dollars'. worth of produce 
at a later date when the produce comes in. They've 
been selling these since last October, I believe. And the 
certificate will be redeemable. That is, the certificates 
will be redeemable for produce next July, August, 
September, when the harvest begins to come in. Now 
from the farmer's point of view, this is simply a loan. 
It's a simple way of getting your customers to lend you 
money. Right? And you're paying back in produce, 
which is much easier for a farmer to do than to pay back 
in cash. So from the farmer's point of view, it's a very 
good way of helping to tide him through the winter and 
provide an income, or provide the necessary cash that he 
needs to survive over the winter, because most farmers' 
income goes up and down--in the summer it's high and 
e winter it's down--and this way he can provide .... 
tow that's from the standpoint of the farmers. From 
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our standpoint, from where we're looking at it, we see 
it as the beginning of a process whereby a currency 
could be created that would circulate locally. Now that 
will only happen if these notes that farmers are issuing 
actually do begin to circulate in the local area, so we've 
been encouraging local merchants and businessmen and 
so on to accept them in trade, just as they would dollars, 
and the more we can get that idea across that these ... 
after all, everybody needs food and there's no reason 
why you couldn't accept this and go get your food with 
it, because many, many people deal with these farmers. 
They're the only two large farm stands in the area. 
They're the largest farm stands in our whole Great 
Barrington region, so they service an awful lot of people 
with local produce, and this way they will be able to 
provide better services for their customers, the farmers 
feel, and the customers will be receiving real value for 
their money. And that way, if we can get it circulating 
around, we will begin the process of initiating local 
circulation of currency. 
David Cayley 
So in effect the farmer is issuing money, which is 
backed by vegetables. 
Robert Swann 
Yes, basically that's what it is, that's really what it is. 
Exactly. He's getting dollars because he needs dollars 
right now, but in the long term, he might not even need 
dollars, he might be able to deal entirely with local 
currency at some point in the future, that is. The other 
thing that's important about this is that this currency will 
only circulate locally. It's not going to get out of the 
local region. When people bank their money today, if 
you put your money into the bank, a commercial bank 
primarily, what does it do with the money you put in the 
bank? Well, it usually buys bonds in Wall Street or it 
buys CD's someplace and it goes out of the community. 
So your money goes out of the community, it doesn't 
stay there, it doesn't work within the community. As 
any economist knows, there are two factors in the value 
of money: one is the face value that it has when you 
present it at the store, but the other is the number of 
times that it changes hands, what's called "velocity" in 
economic terms. The more times that money changes 
hands within a given area, the more work it's doing and 
the more valuable it is, because it's helping everybody 
that much more, you see. An example of that is a little 
town in Germany. Going back to the depression period 
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of the 1930s, this little town, like every town in the 
country, was flat on its face. I mean twenty-five per 
cent unemployment or more, nothing happening. The 
town was flat. So what they did was the mayor of the 
town decided to issue their own currency, which was 
good for paying taxes and other things. So they began 
issuing currency in the town and the way they helped to 
increase the velocity of the circulation of it was to attach 
a tax to the currency. Every month you had to put a 
stamp on the back of the currency that you bought for 
two cents. It was in effect a two per cent tax per month. 
That stamp had to be on there and if you went to the 
store, you couldn't use it unless the stamp was on there. 
And what this had the effect of doing was to step up the 
velocity, the number of times it circulated in the 
community. They actually made a test of it and 
discovered that, compared with other national currencies 
which they'd been dealing with -- shillings at that time - 
- the local currency was circulating three times as much 
locally, three times the velocity, in other words, which 
meant, in effect, it was doing three times as much work 
and therefore was three times as valuable. So there's 
another very important reason for local currency because 
it will continue to stimulate local business. and local 
development. 
David Cayley 
Bob Swann's experience with local currencies goes back 
to 1972, when he participated in an experiment designed 
by Ralph Borsodi in Exeter, New Hampshire. Borsodi 
was already in his nineties at the time and interested 
more in proving a point than in actually establishing a 
permanent currency. So he put into circulation, for a 
short period, a local dollar which he called "a constant." 
Susan Witt 
Ralph had a participation from the beginning from a 
local bank in Exeter. The actual place where you went 
to trade your constants was at the corner bank, and the 
merchants gladly used it. In New England they're such 
individualists and the idea of freeing yourself from the 
federal government, in any form whatsoever, is greatly 
loved and enjoyed. So the merchants took it on. In our 
own town in Great Barrington the merchants have been 
interested in the proposal of a local currency, because 
they see it as a trade dollar that would just bring 
publicity and attention to their shops. Also the 
merchants in Exeter knew that if someone had constants 
in their pocket, they couldn't shop through Sears' 
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catalogue. In a rural area there's a lot of catalogu 
shopping. They would have to come downtown 
Exeter and, in fact, that's exactly what they did. When 
newspapers came and said, "But isn't this illegal, Mr. 
Borsodi?" He said, "Well, just ask the government 
yourself. Call the U.S. treasury and ask yourself." And 
the reporters would call and they would say, "We don't 
care if he's issuing acorns up there, as long as there's an 
exchange rate with the U.S. dollar," so that presumably 
the transactions can be taxed, recorded and taxed. I 
happened to be a student at the time at the University of 
New Hampshire. I had no interest in economics; I was 
a literature major. But rumour went around that 
something was going on in Exeter and that those shops 
that had the constant were the good shops. They were 
for the people and for new ideas and we would actually 
travel from Durham, where we could have gotten the 
products that we needed, fine, just to go to Exeter and 
use this new currency, because it seemed such an 
unusual thing that the people could make their own 
money. It was a powerful, powerful image, of 
tremendous visual power, the idea of an independent 
currency. It's just a statement of our being able to do it 
for ourselves. 
David Cayley 4 
Local currencies have a long history. The single, 
standard federal dollar hasn't always had its present 
monopoly. So when the Schumacher Society started 
planning a new currency, Susan Witt began to hear 
stories about other successful experiences with local 
currencies in her region. 
Susan Witt 
Back in the thirties when the banks collapsed, the 
publisher of one of the Springfield papers at that time 
issued a note to pay his employees. The name of the 
publisher was Samuel Bowles. He was working with the 
Springfield Union Leader and he paid his employees in 
a scrip that was redeemable at the stores that advertised 
in the paper, so the idea was that the employees could at 
least go out there and purchase goods. However, this 
man told us what actually happened was that other 
people would come into the store, the storekeepers 
would have Bowles' money in the drawer and would 
say, "Do you want the federal dollars or do you want 
Bowles' currency?" And the customer would say, 
"Well, I see Bowles every day. I have more confidence 
in him. Give me Bowles' money any day." And so, iA 
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act, that issue of currency, that issue of scrip by Bowles 
kept circulation of trade going even with the banks 
closed. 
David Cayley 
Today the Schumacher Society is working towards 
launching a new currency. There's already a name, "the 
Berkshare," and a plan for establishing and backing the 
new currency's value. 
Susan Witt 
The standard would be tied to cordwood. Cordwood is 
a product that, if you as an individual aren't using it in 
the Berkshires, your aunt uses or your sister-in-law uses, 
and if you haven't actually been out there and cut down 
a cord of wood and stacked it, you've probably at least 
moved a cord of wood from one spot to another when 
you've been at a friend's house. So it's known in the 
body what is the worth of a cord of wood. It's in the 
psyche of the area. Wendell Berry said, "Oh yes, I 
understand. In Kentucky it'd be based on chickens." 
Actually, there's very little need for redemption, just as 
when the federal government in fact had gold as the 
Racking, there was very little need for redemption. 
And, in. fact, the government always even used a 
fractional reserve. Not many people actually want to 
come in and claim their cordwood. It's rather a 
measure. And as wood is an energy, we assume that 
energy prices will go up, so as the federal dollar, the 
federal funny money, devalues, the value of the 
cordwood note will remain constant in its buying power. 
So it will be seen to go up in value in comparison to the 
federal dollar, which would go down in value. So we 
hope that it would be the currency of preference in the 
long run. 
David Cayley 
All the initiatives of the Schumacher Society converge on 
the goal of regional development. The society sees its 
work, Bob Swann says, in the context of its own 
bioregion, meaning by bioregion an area defined by its 
natural, rather than its political, boundaries. 
Robert Swann 
We think of ourselves as a bioregional organization, 
bioregional group, which means in our area, for 
instance, that the Housatonic River defines the central 
leery - it's like the backbone of our region--and on 
oth sides of the Housatonic you have the Berkshire 
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mountains on the east side and on the west side you have 
the Taconic mountains. And the river flows north and 
south and the mountains run north and south, so that 
they go into Connecticut, but because there's a political 
boundary called Connecticut, we don't see that stopping 
the region. The region is quite independent of any 
political boundaries and that's true in the north in the 
same way, though in the north we think of ourselves as 
somewhat bounded by the turnpike, which tends to act 
as a divider of a certain kind. It's a sort of quasi-natural 
feature. Then south into the Connecticut area, down 
through maybe Kent or somewhere in that area where 
again the terrain begins to change. You have a different 
kind of region developing, so it's that rather long region. 
That's what we think of as our region. What it means 
is that, in terms of, say, membership in the land trust, if 
someone from Albany, New York, which is out of our 
region, wants to join the land trust or maybe wants to 
even give us some land and have us use it for our land 
trust, we say, "No, that's out of our region. We want 
you to develop that there in that region and we 
encourage you to do so." So we will provide assistance. 
We will provide technical assistance or whatever we can 
do to help them get something started there, but let them 
define their region then as a separate region. So these 
are the kind of restrictions that we tend to operate on. 
In a general way a fifty-mile radius is all we can handle. 
David Cayley 
Insisting on the regional scale allows Bob Swann to 
harmonize a feeling for nature with a life-long passion 
for economic justice. At the national scale, the demands 
of economic justice and environmental protection are 
usually in conflict. At the local scale, with the right 
economic institutions, they need not be. The change of 
scale and the change of institutions, Susan Witt believes, 
offers a way beyond the paralyzing contradictions of a 
society based on mass markets. 
Susan Witt 
It's a practical approach to living more gently on the 
land in the community. Instead of saying "no" to things, 
which is a major part of the environmental movement, 
1 think, right now -- a lot of energy is spent saying, 
"No, don't do that. Let's stop that," --we're saying 
"yes" to a different type of development and showing 
how it can occur and how a community can help that 
occur. So instead of saying "no," we're saying "yes." 






and living and creating economic development on the 
land, rather than just saying no more development at all. 
What Schumacher always called for was local production 
for local consumption. That's how you're going to 
reduce the dependence on fossil fuels, on large-scale 
eating up of the environment, but in order to achieve 
that vision, you've got to work in your own region. It's 
going to be regional development. That's what Jane 
Jacobs calls for. So in order to work on the solution, 
rather than just living in this schizophrenia of "No, no, 
don't do any more there, but let me have my car and the 
second car and third car," there needs to be a positive 
solution and approach to solving some of our real social 
problems at the local level in a way that works within 
the environment, with that environment of that area. 
And we're trying to take those steps. 
Robert Swann 
If people are exploited, land will be exploited. If a 
farmer, for instance, is loaded down with a mortgage on 
land, which requires him to meet payments, because the 
price of the land has gone up so high that in reality he 
can't really afford it, but he's trying to, as many, many 
farmers are. Thousands of farmers are struggling under 
the weight of borrowed money to pay back the price of 
buying the land and therefore are only able to farm that 
land in a way that maximizes their income from the 
land. And what does that mean? If you're going to 
maximize your income, it means you're going to do 
things which are bad for the land. You're going to 
over-farm it, you're going to restrict yourself more to 
corn and other kinds of crops, which are the major cause 
of soil erosion, for example. It's just a known fact that 
that's what happens. Any kind of land which has been 
overpriced to the farmer is going to be exploited. The 
farmer can't help it. It's not because he wants to. He 
might, but he probably doesn't. He's got to do that in 
order to meet his mortgage payments and that's where 
all this comes together, because it's the interest on the 
money that in large part is causing his major trouble., 
This is where the two aspects of what we work with 
come together: the need for access to land that everyone 
has, and at the same time access to capital, access to the 
funds that are needed to make it work. Those two have 
to have a marriage. There has to be low-cost money, as 
well as low-cost land, for a " farmer to produce good- 
quality food, you know, the best-quality food, and to not 
exploit the land. Those two have to come together. 
And in our present institutional system that doesn't 
happen. That simply doesn't happen. So there is 
natural exploitation that takes place. 
E.F. Schumacher 
The real question behind all this is, "What are we 
about?" Are we mainly interested in building production 
or in building society? If we're mainly interested in 
building production maybe we can get more production 
by becoming more and more highly specialized and, to 
use the agricultural term, going in for more and more 
monoculture, so that a huge province produces nothing 
but wheat. Well, if there's nothing but wheat 
production, life becomes very, very dull and it isn't a 
real society. It's really a sort of colonial status where 
you work on one thing for the benefit of the big town, 
not for the benefit of the community who are actually 
doing the work. Now, we have been building this 
system of production for the last two hundred years, but 
the society seems to become tottering more and more, 
incurring bigger and bigger risks of a real breakdown, 
where we're no longer debating whether it's five per 
cent more profitable or less profitable, to do this or that, 
but we're debating our survival. Think of it! 
Lister Sinclair 
E.F. Schumacher speaking in 1975. His words conclude 
tonight's program, the fourth and last of our series on 
redefining development. Heard on tonight's program 
were Susan Witt and Bob Swann of the Schumacher 
Society in Great Barrington, Massachusetts. The series 
was written and presented by David Cayley. Technical 
production by Lome Tulk; production assistants: Gail 
Brownell and Faye Macpherson. The executive 
producer of Ideas is Bernie Lucht. 
Transcription by Hedy Muysson. 
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